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the Court decides. This Article identifies circumstances in which the
relationship between the Court and other federal courts is best viewed as neither
top-down nor bottom-up, but side-by-side. When the Court intervenes in fierce
political conflicts, it may proceed in stages, interacting with other federal courts
in a way that is aimed at enhancing its public legitimacy. First, the Court
renders a decision that is interpreted as encouraging, but not requiring, other
federal courts to expand the scope of its initial ruling. Then, most federal courts
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do expand the scope of the ruling, relying upon the Court’s initial decision as
authority for doing so. Finally, the Court responds by invoking those district
and circuit court decisions as authority for its own more definitive resolution.
That dialectical process, which this Article calls “reciprocal legitimation,” was
present along the path from Brown v. Board of Education to the unreasoned per
curiams, from Baker v. Carr to Reynolds v. Sims, and from United States v.
Windsor to Obergefell v. Hodges—as partially captured by Appendix A to the
Court’s opinion in Obergefell and the opinion’s several references to it. This
Article identifies the phenomenon of reciprocal legitimation, explains that it
may initially be intentional or unintentional, and examines its implications for
theories of constitutional change and scholarship in federal courts and judicial
politics. Although the Article’s primary contribution is descriptive and
analytical, it also normatively assesses reciprocal legitimation given the
sacrifice of judicial candor that may accompany it. A Coda examines the
likelihood and desirability of reciprocal legitimation in response to President
Donald Trump’s derision of the federal courts as political and so illegitimate.
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INTRODUCTION
Given its legal and cultural significance, Obergefell v. Hodges
has to be one of the most widely read and discussed Supreme Court
decisions in recent memory.1 Yet judging from the reactions in the law
reviews, the casebooks, the blogosphere, the media, and even the
dissenting opinions in the case, no one seems to have emphasized a
potentially significant feature of the majority opinion.2 The Court
repeatedly implied that it was responding to developments in the
federal courts, suggestions that were nothing but the truth. But they
were not the whole truth. In all likelihood, the Court itself was partially
responsible for causing those developments in United States v. Windsor3
and its aftermath.4 What is more, the Court may have intended to cause
those developments.
In explaining why it had to decide whether states may prohibit
same-sex marriage, the Court in Obergefell pointed to the existence of
a circuit conflict.5 And in holding that same-sex marriage falls within
the scope of the fundamental right to marry, the Court made clear that
it was adopting the majority view in the federal district and circuit
courts—all listed in Appendix A to its opinion.6 What the Court did not
do is acknowledge that all of the federal court rulings in favor of samesex marriage came after Windsor. Nor did the Court acknowledge that
its opinion in Windsor seemed tailor-made to generating a lopsided
circuit split in favor of same-sex marriage. The Court in Obergefell
seemed to be trying to legitimate its controversial conclusion in part by
portraying federal court decisions concerning same-sex marriage as if
they were entirely independent of its decision in Windsor, when in all
likelihood they were not.

1.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2.
Research has not revealed an account like the one offered here.
3.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
4.
On October 6, 2014, the Court denied certiorari in seven same-sex marriage cases, all of
which had resulted in rulings in favor of marriage equality, thus allowing those decisions to go
into effect. See Order List: 574 U.S., SUP. CT. U.S. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders%5C100614zor.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR2Y-ZEDQ].
5.
See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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The Court’s conduct in Windsor and Obergefell is not sui generis;
it is generalizable in at least two ways, one common and the other
uncommon. First, the Court often alters judicial precedent, impacts the
course of legislation, or affects public opinion and then later cites those
changes in support of its own further conclusions. In so acting, the
Court often does not acknowledge that it played a role in producing
those changes. Second, when the Court takes on issues that deeply
divide Americans, it characteristically takes steps to protect its public
legitimacy, often in ways that are not fully candid. One way in which it
may do so is by interacting dialectically with other federal courts.
The dialectical nature of the Court’s interaction with other
federal courts in Windsor and Obergefell was also evident (with a
notable twist) in the conduct of the Court that decided Brown v. Board
of Education,7 the subsequent federal court decisions that expanded the
scope of the Court’s holding in Brown to racial segregation in other
public settings, and the Court’s unreasoned per curiams that validated
the expansion.8 A similar dialectic was present (with an important
difference) in the Court’s reapportionment decisions, beginning with
Baker v. Carr9 and culminating in Reynolds v. Sims.10 By contrast,
reciprocal legitimation has so far failed to result from the Court’s
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller11 and McDonald v. City of
Chicago,12 although what the Court intended in those decisions is
unclear at this point.
The judicial phenomenon that this Article documents and
generalizes can be understood as a process of reciprocal legitimation.
The process is reciprocal because lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court each enlist the support of the other. Specifically, district and
circuit courts seek to legitimate their decisions by relying upon an
initial Supreme Court decision (e.g., Windsor) as authority for
expanding the scope of the decision, and the Supreme Court in a later
decision (e.g., Obergefell) seeks to blunt threats to its own legitimacy by
invoking those district and circuit court decisions as authority for
validating the expansion.
Reciprocal legitimation takes two basic forms: it is either
intended by the Court as an original matter, or it is unintended. In a
case of intended reciprocal legitimation, such as Brown, the Court first
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
For a discussion of the post-Brown per curiams, see infra Sections II.B.1 and IV.A.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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intends for other federal courts to expand the scope of its initial decision
and then later relies on those federal court decisions as authority in
eventually validating the expansion. In a case of unintended reciprocal
legitimation, such as Baker, the Court causes other federal courts to
expand the scope of its initial decision without intending that result but
nonetheless relies upon those federal court decisions as authority in
eventually validating the expansion. This Article, while mindful of the
perils of speculation absent internal evidence, will suggest that the
Court may have intended reciprocal legitimation in Windsor. If that is
correct, it is worth exploring why the Court deemed it desirable to
proceed in that fashion. But even if the Court did not intend reciprocal
legitimation in Windsor, it set the process in motion, and that process
constitutes a potentially important part of how the American
constitutional system functions.
The process of reciprocal legitimation has not previously been
recognized. The closest idea to it in the law review literature is
Professor Richard Re’s astute observation that federal courts
sometimes narrow Supreme Court precedent because of (among other
possibilities) signals from the Court that the precedent should be
narrowed.13 Re does not suggest, however, that in certain circumstances
the Court may invoke the fact of such narrowing as authority for
validating it.
The analysis that follows has implications for constitutional law
scholarship that emphasizes the role of political forces in identifying
mechanisms of constitutional change, including Professor Bruce
Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments,” Professors Jack Balkin
and Sanford Levinson’s theory of “partisan entrenchment,” Professor
Barry Friedman’s theory of the agency of public opinion in shaping the
Court’s decisions, and Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel’s theory
of “democratic constitutionalism.”14 One lesson of recent gay rights
litigation is that, to a greater extent than is recognized by any of those
theories, constitutional change can be driven not just by political actors,
but also by legal elites—by judges. Instead of simply responding to the
gestalt or public opinion, judges on different courts may work together
to actively shape public opinion through orchestration behind the
scenes.

13. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921
(2016). For a review of both Re’s article and this one, see Doni Gewirtzman, The High Power of the
Lower Courts, PUBLIC BOOKS (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.publicbooks.org/blog/high-powerlowercourts [https://perma.cc/3XBC-WNAN].
14. For discussion of those theories, see infra Section III.A.
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This Article also has implications for scholarship in the fields of
federal courts and judicial politics. Much of that scholarship either
studies the Supreme Court without regard to its relationship to other
courts, or else conceives of the Court and other federal courts as relating
hierarchically—as principal and faithful agent—and therefore as
constituting distinct institutions with different jobs to do. In contrast to
such top-down models, other scholarship takes more of a bottom-up
approach, either viewing the lower federal courts as unruly agents or
analyzing the phenomenon of issue percolation in the lower federal
courts before the Supreme Court decides. As already noted, however,
another lesson of recent gay rights litigation (and desegregation and
reapportionment litigation before it) is that the Court and other federal
courts interact dialectically in interesting ways; they are part of the
same federal courts system—a system in which lines of communication
and influence can run back and forth, not just down or up. If one models
that system as consisting of both nodes and links between nodes, the
nodes begin to look different—and sometimes appear more, rather than
less, alike—when viewed in the light cast by the links. The dialectical,
side-by-side model of judicial interactions developed in this Article is
distinct from approaches that emphasize either top-down hierarchy or
bottom-up resistance or percolation.15
Part I documents the interaction between the Supreme Court
and other federal courts beginning in Windsor and culminating in
Obergefell. Part II generalizes by explaining that this episode is one
instance of two larger judicial phenomena. Part III draws implications
for the study of constitutional change and the study of federal courts in
law and political science. Part III also identifies extensions of the model
to state courts and non-judicial actors and to judicial phenomena like
experimentation and learning, which can blend into reciprocal
legitimation.
This Article is primarily interested in identifying a judicial
phenomenon and analyzing its implications, not praising or burying it.
Nonetheless, reciprocal legitimation—especially, but not only, its
intentional variant—implicates difficult questions about the
circumstances in which, and the extent to which, it is permissible for
judges to be less than fully candid about what they are doing.16
Accordingly, Part IV normatively assesses the Court’s conduct in
15. For discussion, see infra Sections I.B and III.B.
16. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987)
(defending a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor and citing prominent scholars who
have taken an opposing view); cf. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990)
(arguing that judges should be candid but non-introspective).
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Windsor and Obergefell. The Conclusion summarizes the argument,
and a Coda suggests that it is reasonable to anticipate—and to defend—
reciprocal legitimation in response to President Donald Trump’s
repeated attacks on the legitimacy of federal judges who rule against
him.
Before proceeding, however, two clarifications are in order.
First, for the most part this Article conceptualizes “the Court,” not
individual Justices, as the relevant unit of analysis, even though it is
familiar learning that a collegial court is a “they,” not an “it.” The
Article proceeds in that fashion for two reasons. First, it is often
impossible to know what recently happened at the level of individual
Justices. For example, one suspects that Justice Ginsburg asked Justice
Kennedy to include some equality reasoning in the majority opinion in
Obergefell,17 but that is just speculation, and, even if true, it is also
speculative whether Kennedy agreed to do so because he thought it was
a good suggestion or because he wanted to avoid separate opinions from
Justices in the majority. Second, the idea of collective intent is more
coherent than is suggested by academic criticism of the concept (often,
but not only, when analyzing claims about original intent).18 It
sometimes (although not always) makes sense to view the members of
an institution or organization as sharing an objective, particularly
when the institution is composed of a small number of people.19
Second, where to start a story depends upon one’s purposes in
telling it. Just as Brown is not the beginning of the Supreme Court’s
dismantling of an apartheid social order in the American South,
Windsor is obviously not the beginning of the Court’s gradual insistence
that gay people possess constitutional rights that government is
required to respect.20 But Windsor is a useful starting point for
documenting the reciprocal reliance between the Supreme Court and
other federal courts that is the focus of this Article. If the focus were
instead on the interactions between the Court and state courts

17. See infra note 262 (discussing the equality reasoning toward the end of the majority
opinion in Obergefell).
18. See generally, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (identifying problems that attend attempts to discover the original
intent of the Framers); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419
(2005) (identifying problems that attend ascriptions of unitary intent to multi-member bodies).
19. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 194 (2010) (dismissing the argument
that “there is no such thing as ‘collective intent’ ” as “bad philosophy, bad psychology, and bad
law”); id. at 194–95 (“[T]o suggest that one can never meaningfully ask what Congress was driving
at in this or that statutory provision because Congress is not a collective body is to deny that people
can ever share a purpose.”). The “not” in the second parenthetical appears to be a drafting error.
20. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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concerning same-sex marriage, a better starting point would be
Lawrence v. Texas,21 including Justice Scalia’s dissent.22 As suggested
by Appendix B of the Court’s opinion in Obergefell, and as explored in
Part III.C, some state courts began invalidating bans on same-sex
marriage after Lawrence.
I. AN ACCOUNT OF WINDSOR AND OBERGEFELL
A. Federalism as a Way Station
As developed elsewhere, the Windsor Court appeared to use
“federalism as a way station” by “combining equal protection reasoning
with the analytical and rhetorical resources of federalism both to selfconsciously lean in the direction of marriage equality and to not yet
embrace it entirely.”23 On the one hand—the hand that conceives of
federalism as limiting federal power—the Court emphasized that the
all-purpose restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples in the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) was constitutionally suspect
because of its extraordinary interference with state control over
domestic relations law.24 That reasoning seemed to imply that the
states, not the federal government, are authorized to decide who may
marry whom. Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent, so read the majority
opinion.25
On the other hand—the hand that used federalism in the service
of living constitutionalism and emphasized the equal dignity of gay
people—the Court celebrated the minority of states that were allowing
same-sex marriage while ignoring the majority that were banning it;
qualified its discussion of state control over domestic relations law by
stating three times that states must respect constitutional rights; and
emphasized (based on DOMA’s title, legislative history, and
consequences) that the statute had the purpose, effect, and social
meaning of demeaning the dignity of same-sex couples and their
children.26 That reasoning seemed to imply that state bans on same-sex
marriage are at least as constitutionally problematic as the federal ban
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–606.
22. See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”).
23. Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion,
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 144 (2014).
24. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2013).
25. Id. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2689–95 (majority opinion).

1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/1/2017 1:59 PM

RECIPROCAL LEGITIMATION

1191

at issue in Windsor. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, so read the majority
opinion.27
Why did the Court issue such an opinion? As discussed further
in the next Section, it is hazardous to speculate about the collective
intent of the Justices in the majority absent access to the Court’s
internal proceedings. But by resisting any dispositive “equality” or
“federalism” interpretation and preserving for itself a certain Delphic
obscurity, the Court in Windsor may have intended to generate a circuit
conflict: there was something for both sides in the opinion, and the
appellate courts were understood by the Court to be ideologically
diverse. What is more, the Court may have intended to create a lopsided
split in favor of marriage equality: there was much more in the opinion
for gay rights advocates to use than their opponents.28 In addition,
public opinion was moving with dispatch in favor of same-sex marriage,
as the Court surely knew.29
That, of course, is exactly what happened. Federal courts, in
invalidating state bans on same-sex marriage, invoked Windsor in two
primary ways. (This Article discusses the decisions of the federal circuit
courts, not the district courts, both because there are fewer of them and
because they are more influential.) First, the Supreme Court in 1972
had held in a one-line summary decision that a state law preventing
same-sex couples from marrying did not present a substantial federal
question.30 In explaining why that decision, Baker v. Nelson, was no
longer controlling, appellate courts invoked the Court’s decision in
Windsor, which did not discuss Baker. “[S]ince Windsor was decided,”
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reported, “nearly every
federal court to have considered the issue—including the district court
below—has ruled that Baker does not control.”31 Typical was the
27. Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. While this Article analyzes Windsor’s impact on federal courts, Windsor also empowered
other actors who were engaged in the process: gay rights activists, litigants, lawmakers, state
officials, and state courts.
29. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), was decided alongside Windsor. The Court
held 5-4—in an unusual lineup—that the official proponents of Proposition 8, which amended the
California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, lacked Article III standing to appeal the
district court’s order invalidating Proposition 8. Hollingsworth is consistent with the
interpretation of Windsor presented here. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, who were in the
majority in Hollingsworth, likely did not want to decide the constitutionality of a state ban on
same-sex marriage at that time. By contrast, Justice Kennedy, who dissented (along with Justice
Sotomayor, the fifth Justice in the Windsor majority), was prepared to reach the merits out of
concern for the viability of the initiative process. But he likely would have decided the merits
narrowly, perhaps by emphasizing Proposition 8’s withdrawal of a right that same-sex couples had
previously enjoyed. For elaboration, see Siegel, supra note 23, at 135–40.
30. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
31. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1206 (10th Cir. 2014).

1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1192

5/1/2017 1:59 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1183

reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which
wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court’s willingness to decide Windsor
without mentioning Baker speaks volumes regarding whether Baker
remains good law.”32
Second, circuit courts leaned heavily on Windsor in ruling in
favor of marriage equality either on substantive due process grounds33
or on equal protection grounds.34 For example, in holding that Virginia’s
ban on same-sex marriage violated the fundamental right to marry, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that “Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the
choices that individuals make in the context of same-sex relationships
enjoy the same constitutional protection as the choices accompanying
opposite-sex relationships.”35 And in holding that Idaho’s and Nevada’s
bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutionally discriminated on the
basis of sexual orientation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit expressly applied heightened scrutiny,36 which it had previously
read Windsor to require.37
At the same time, almost every dissenting judge in those cases
distinguished Windsor as a federalism decision.38 “In Windsor,” Judge
O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit observed, “the Court struck down a
federal law that intruded on a state’s prerogative to define marriage.”39
“If anything,” he continued, “Windsor’s emphasis on the unprecedented
federal intrusion into the states’ authority over domestic relations

32. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 374 (4th Cir. 2014).
33. See Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (relying upon Windsor in holding that
Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage violates the fundamental right to marry); Bishop v. Smith, 760
F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (relying upon Windsor in holding that Oklahoma’s ban on samesex marriage violates the fundamental right to marry); Bostic, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (2-1)
(relying upon Windsor in holding that Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage violates the
fundamental right to marry).
34. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (3-0) (relying upon Windsor in holding
that Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s bans on same-sex marriage violate equal protection because they
irrationally discriminate against same-sex couples); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014)
(3-0) (relying upon Windsor in holding that Idaho’s and Nevada’s bans on same-sex marriage
violate equal protection because they unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation).
35. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 377.
36. Latta, 771 F.3d at 468.
37. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (3-0) (holding
that Windsor requires courts to subject classifications based upon sexual orientation to heightened
scrutiny).
38. Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit used Windsor somewhat differently. See Bostic, 760
F.3d at 392, 396 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (reading Windsor as recognizing “the inextricable,
biological link between marriage and procreation,” and emphasizing that the “Court made no
change as to the appropriate level of scrutiny in its more recent decision in Windsor”).
39. See Latta v. Otter, 779 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 2015) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial of reh’g en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S 810 (1972)).
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reaffirms Baker’s conclusion that a state’s definition of marriage
presents no ‘substantial federal question.’ ”40 Along similar lines, Judge
Kelly of the Tenth Circuit asserted that “Windsor protected valid samegender, state law marriages based on federalism concerns, as well as
Fifth Amendment due process and implied equal protection concerns.”41
“Given an unusual federal intrusion into state authority,” he reasoned,
“the Court analyzed the nature, purpose, and effect of the federal law,
alert for discrimination of ‘unusual character.’ ”42
In the wake of those appellate decisions, the Supreme Court
further nudged the federal courts in the direction of marriage equality
by denying certiorari in all of them.43 The Court also remarkably
declined to stay the judgments of courts in subsequent cases that ruled
in favor of same-sex marriage.44 From a realist perspective, those last
moves made it inconceivable that the Court would subsequently issue a
decision effectively un-marrying thousands of couples it had just freed
to marry. When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
generated the split by reading Windsor as imposing no constitutional
limits on the states,45 the Court granted certiorari.
In resolving the circuit conflict, the Court in Obergefell listed in
Appendix A the many federal court decisions that had addressed state
bans on same-sex marriage; it did not acknowledge that those
decisions—in contrast to the state legislation and judicial decisions
listed in Appendix B—were overwhelmingly decided post-Windsor.46
Nor did it acknowledge that all of the federal court decisions
invalidating state bans were post-Windsor. The Court referenced
Appendix A three times in its opinion. It explained that there was both
40. Id.
41. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)).
42. Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693); see Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1109 (10th
Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (adhering to his views in Kitchen).
43. See Order List, 574 U.S., supra note 4 (citing the Order List from October 6, 2014).
44. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Court Won’t Add to Delay of Florida Same-Sex Marriages,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 19, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/court-wont-add-todelay-of-florida-same-sex-marriages/ [https://perma.cc/L6HQ-2FCH] (“In refusing the request by
Florida officials, the Court followed the pattern that it had maintained for the past two-and-a-half
months of routinely turning aside requests to put on hold lower court rulings that had struck down
state bans on same-sex marriage.”).
45. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413–15 (6th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (upholding restrictions
on same-sex marriage in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee using the following reasoning:
“Why was DOMA anomalous? Only federalism can supply the answer. The national statute
trespassed upon New York’s time-respected authority to define the marital relation . . . . Today’s
case involves no such [divesting] of a marriage status granted through a State’s authority over
domestic relations within its borders . . .”).
46. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608–11 (2015).
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a split that needed resolving47 and a majority view in the circuits that
it was adopting.48 The Court largely took itself out of the deliberative
interactions it described.
For example, in rejecting the argument that it should await
further developments before declaring a right to same-sex marriage, the
Court detailed the participation of almost every actor but itself in
debates over same-sex marriage:
There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as
countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings. There has
been extensive litigation in state and federal courts. See Appendix A, infra. Judicial
opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of parties and
counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage
and its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As more than 100 amici make
clear in their filings, many of the central institutions in American life—state and local
governments, the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religious
organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional organizations, and
universities—have devoted substantial attention to the question. This has led to an
enhanced understanding of the issue—an understanding reflected in the arguments now
presented for resolution as a matter of constitutional law.49

The Court portrayed the opinions of the federal courts as having been
informed directly or indirectly by the arguments of litigants, lawyers,
and society—not in part by the Court itself in Windsor.
In sum, the Court in Obergefell invoked the authority of the
many federal court decisions that had invalidated state prohibitions on
same-sex marriage, which in turn had relied on the Court’s own
decision in Windsor. The Court did not disclose the existence of any
reciprocal reliance—of any reciprocal legitimation. It instead presented
federal court decisions as independent developments to which it was

47. See id. at 2606 (“Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals—a
disagreement that caused impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal law—the
Court granted review to determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”).
48. See id. at 2597:
With the exception of the opinion here under review and one other, see Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 864–868 (CA8 2006), the Courts of Appeals
have held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates the Constitution.
There also have been many thoughtful District Court decisions addressing same-sex
marriage—and most of them, too, have concluded same-sex couples must be allowed to
marry. In addition the highest courts of many States have contributed to this ongoing
dialogue in decisions interpreting their own State Constitutions. These state and
federal judicial opinions are cited in Appendix A, infra;
see also id. at 2593 (“Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home
States. Each District Court ruled in their favor. Citations to those cases are in Appendix A, infra.”).
49. Id. at 2605.
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required to respond in order to ensure uniformity in the interpretation
of important questions of federal law.50
It is common, although not inevitable, for the Court to invoke
the prevailing view in the circuits as confirming its own conclusion—for
example, when it rejects the position of an outlier circuit.51 What is
different about the phenomenon discussed here is that the Court,
through its decision in Windsor, likely played a causal role in
determining which view would prevail in the circuits. What is also
potentially different is that the Court may have intended to do so.
B. A Preliminary Defense of the Account
The foregoing interpretation is unlikely to satisfy scholars who
are skeptical of claims of subjective judicial intent—and for good reason.
Absent “smoking gun” evidence, which is currently unavailable, it is
impossible to establish the subjective intent of any—let alone all—of
the five members of the Windsor majority. It remains possible that the
Court was uncertain about what to do, was simply awaiting further
developments and learning, and was pushing its decision off for another
day, which came sooner than expected. That interpretation seems
unable to account for the extent to which the majority opinion in
Windsor leaned in the direction of marriage equality, but perhaps
another interpretation can.
It matters if the Court in Windsor intended what followed, both
because it raises the question of why it acted with such an intent (see
Part II.B), and because such an intent may affect a normative
assessment of the Court’s conduct (see Part IV). But it also matters that
reciprocal legitimation subsequently occurred regardless of the intent
of the Windsor majority. That is, even if the Court in Windsor caused
subsequent events without intending to do so, other federal courts still
invoked its decision as authority for invalidating state bans on samesex marriage, and the Court in Obergefell still invoked those decisions
as authority in validating the result that most federal courts had
reached.

50. A different dialogue took place among judges on the appellate courts themselves, who
invoked developments in sister circuits. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 430 (6th Cir.
2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (“These four cases from our sister circuits provide a rich mine of
responses to every rationale raised by the defendants in the Sixth Circuit cases as a basis for
excluding same-sex couples from contracting valid marriages.”).
51. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851,
853 (2003) (“In reading the Court’s opinions, one sometimes finds statements to the effect that a
particular decision accords with, or departs from, the views of most of the lower courts.”).
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The foregoing interpretation of events is also unlikely to satisfy
empiricists. It is difficult to demonstrate empirically the extent to which
the Court’s opinion in Windsor caused the reactions of the federal courts
in its wake (just as it is difficult to establish the causal relationship
between those reactions and the Court’s opinion in Obergefell). Perhaps
the Court and other federal courts were moving independently in
response to the same general conception of human rights52 or the same
changes in public opinion, which were reflected in the position of the
Obama Administration that classifications drawn on the basis of sexual
orientation warrant heightened scrutiny.53 Although this Article cannot
rule out that possibility, it likely does not tell the whole story. The
probable consequences of the Court’s decision in Windsor were
predictable—and were predicted—at the time it was decided.54
As Professor Katie Eyer observes, moreover, “[T]he history of
gay equality claims in the lower federal courts suggests that such courts
may be slower and more hesitant than the Supreme Court to make
doctrinal moves responsive to broader shifts in constitutional culture,
particularly in the absence of some clear doctrinal signal from the Court
itself.”55 Windsor offered such a signal, even if (perhaps by design) it
was not an entirely clear one. It was clear enough to embolden willing
federal judges to go where they wanted to go—and where, perhaps,
their grandchildren wanted them to go. (The fact that those federal
judges wanted to decide in favor of marriage equality is what makes the
legitimation reciprocal, as opposed to one-sided.) But the Court’s signal

52. The Court may be making such an appeal when it cites foreign law. See, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The right the petitioners seek in this case
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is
somehow more legitimate or urgent.”).
53. See Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 197, 215
(2013) (“[T]he Obama intervention seems to have been received by the lower courts, in the absence
of authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court, as a signal that heightened scrutiny is once
again a respectable—if perhaps not mandatory—doctrinal approach.”).
54. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 23, at 133–34:
Over the next year or two, some more socially conservative or cautious judges may
uphold certain state bans on same-sex marriage by distinguishing Windsor on the
grounds advanced by Chief Justice Roberts and discussed in Part 2. But one can also
expect other such bans to continue to fall, generating splits of authority and returning
the question to the Court . . . .
In his Windsor dissent, Justice Scalia predicted that the Court would invalidate all state
prohibitions on same-sex marriage in the near future. See infra note 236.
55. Eyer, supra note 53, at 216.
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was not so clear as to effectively require unwilling federal courts or
judges to go there as well.
Is it accurate to characterize the Court as involved in
persuasion, not compulsion, when it is an authority vis-à-vis the group
(other federal courts) with which it is communicating? A skeptic might
wonder what kind of communication from the Court would count as
persuasion that would not also count as either precedent or strongly
worded dicta. Such skepticism draws attention to the important point
that hierarchy is always present to a non-trivial extent, and a fuller
discussion of the issue must await Part IV.B. For now, it is worth
reiterating that the Windsor Court seemed to go out of its way to offer
something to both sides in the debate over same-sex marriage, even as
it offered more to one side. In addition, there is a difference between a
nudge and a shove. The Windsor Court, in essence, offered a nudge.
II. TWO GENERALIZATIONS OF THE ACCOUNT
Although the short amount of time that elapsed between
Windsor and Obergefell may be uncommon and indeed dizzying, little
else about the Court’s behavior in those cases is unprecedented. This
Part identifies two ways, one common and the other not, in which the
Court’s conduct constitutes one instance of more general judicial
phenomena.
A. Judicial Precedent, Legislative Trends, and Public Opinion
First, when the Court seeks to alter substantially the course of
the law, and even when it has no such conscious intention initially, it
may affect the content of potential sources of legal authority—including
judicial precedent, legislation trends, and public opinion—only to later
invoke those changes in support of more aggressive doctrinal
conclusions. For example, the Court in McLaughlin v. Florida justified
its invalidation of a state law that punished interracial cohabitation
more severely than intraracial cohabitation by citing (among other
decisions) Brown v. Board of Education,56 whose holding a decade

56. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964):
[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must
be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in
the States. . . . Thus it is that racial classifications have been held invalid in a variety
of contexts. See, e.g., . . . Brown v. Board of Education . . . .
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earlier the Court had expressly limited to the field of public education.57
Three years later, the Court invoked McLaughlin in striking down antimiscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia.58 Similarly, the Court in
Roper v. Simmons overruled earlier precedent permitting the juvenile
death penalty by invoking, among other things, its intervening decision
in Atkins v. Virginia, which prohibited the execution of the
intellectually disabled.59
Examples of that kind of move abound not just in constitutional
law, but also in the field of federal courts. For example, after the Court
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida held that Congress is barred
from using most of its Article I powers to override the states’ sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court,60 the Court in Alden v. Maine held
that, given Seminole Tribe, it would be anomalous to allow Congress to
use those same powers to abrogate state immunity in state court. 61
Dissenting, Justice Souter called out the Court for bootstrapping its
way to an unjustified conclusion:
The short and sufficient answer is that the anomaly is the Court’s own creation: the
Eleventh Amendment was never intended to bar federal-question suits against the States
in federal court. The anomaly is that Seminole Tribe, an opinion purportedly grounded in
the Eleventh Amendment, should now be used as a lever to argue for state sovereign
immunity in state courts, to which the Eleventh Amendment by its terms does not
apply.62

Using past decisions as authority for further extensions is broader than
bootstrapping and is common.63 It is the progression of precedent
57. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
58. 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967):
We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in
the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory
advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied
by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so long as white and
Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 . . . (1964).
59. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989), and relying in part on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13, 317–21 (2002)):
[T]o the extent Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is required
to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty
for a particular class of crimes or offenders, it suffices to note that this rejection was . . .
inconsistent with the premises of our recent decision in Atkins.
(citations omitted).
60. 517 U.S. 44, 44–46 (1996).
61. 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999).
62. Id. at 800 n.33 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Bootstrapping occurs when “an actor undertakes permissible action Y and thereby
renders its action Z legally permissible, as the actor’s undertaking of Z absent Y would raise
serious legal problems.” Stuart Benjamin, Bootstrapping, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2012, at 115,
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characteristic of common law constitutionalism.64
When the Court leverages judicial precedent as justification for
further expansions, it may seem relatively obvious (although see below)
that the Court is responsible for having caused previous changes in the
doctrine because the Court is citing itself. Likewise, the Court’s
emphasis on reliance interests as one of several considerations in
decisions about stare decisis transparently exemplifies the feedback
loop discussed here. The Court explained in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that when it reexamines a previous
decision, “its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential
and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge
the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”65 Among
other questions, the Court asks “whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.”66 The Court is
thus candid about its own previous role in causing other actors to
behave in ways that it is currently taking into account in preserving a
particular result.
Another “Casey” factor that the Court considers is changes in the
law: “whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.”67 As
justification for overturning precedent, the Court may invoke tensions
in the doctrine and countervailing lines of precedent, even though it
obviously contributed to those tensions. An example from constitutional

116. Reciprocal legitimation need not be an instance of bootstrapping so defined. For example, it
was not necessary for the Court to issue its holding in Windsor in order to render its holding in
Obergefell legally unproblematic. Rather, it was Lawrence that deemed moral opposition to
homosexuality an illegitimate state interest. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003)
(“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .” (quoting
with approval Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). Part of
what is noteworthy about reciprocal legitimation is that the Court proceeds in stages even though
it is not legally required to do so. On the other hand, if one defines bootstrapping in terms of the
Court’s public legitimacy instead of its legal legitimacy, see infra Section II.B, then the instances
of reciprocal legitimation discussed in this Article are also instances of bootstrapping, with the
interesting wrinkle that multiple courts are involved in the process.
64. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (describing his theory
of common law constitutionalism). For earlier expressions of his theory, see David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
65. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 855.
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law is Lawrence v. Texas.68 The Court reasoned that “[t]wo principal
cases decided after Bowers cast its holding into even more doubt,”69 and
proceeded to discuss Casey and Romer v. Evans.70 An example from the
field of federal courts is Monell v. Department of Social Services,71 which
overruled the holding of Monroe v. Pape that municipalities may not be
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.72 The Monell Court reasoned in part that
“our cases—decided both before and after Monroe . . .—holding school
boards liable in § 1983 actions are inconsistent with Monroe,” so that
“it can scarcely be said that Monroe is so consistent with the warp and
woof of civil rights law as to be beyond question.”73
Again, when the Court invokes its own precedent, it may seem
obvious that the Court is relying upon changes that it caused. It may
not, however, always be so obvious. One should recall that the Court is
a “they,” not an “it,” not just at a particular point in time, but also over
time. It may not be apparent to all consumers of its opinions whether
the Court is citing a previous Court or the current one.
The Court can have an impact on the course of legislation that
is similar to its impact on the course of judicial precedent, and it may
subsequently take advantage of that impact without being entirely
candid about what is going on. Perhaps the best example is Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, where the Court expressly looks in part to
objective indicia of “evolving standards of decency” in order to
determine whether a national consensus rejects a particular
punishment for a particular crime.74 For example, in holding in
Kennedy v. Louisiana that the Constitution categorically prohibits the
death penalty for child rape, the Court emphasized that only six states
permitted capital punishment for that offense.75 In dissent, Justice
Alito charged that “this statistic is a highly unreliable indicator of the
views of state lawmakers and their constituents.”76 Dicta in the Court’s
decision thirty years earlier in Coker v. Georgia,77 he explained,
gave state legislators and others good reason to fear that any law permitting the
imposition of the death penalty for this crime would meet precisely the fate that has now

68. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
69. Id. at 573–74 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
70. Id. at 574–76 (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
71. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
72. 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
73. Monell, 436 U.S. at 696.
74. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
75. 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008).
76. Id. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting).
77. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for
the rape of an adult woman).
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befallen the Louisiana statute that is currently before us, and this threat strongly
discouraged state legislators—regardless of their own values and those of their
constituents—from supporting the enactment of such legislation.78

The Court is also characteristically not candid about its previous
role in causing legal or social change when it invokes shifts in public
opinion. The Court has a history of first affecting public opinion
(admittedly, in complex ways79) and then later citing those effects in
support of more controversial conclusions. One example is the Court’s
notation in Loving of the fourteen states that had repealed their
prohibitions on interracial marriage over the previous fifteen years.80
That development was likely affected by the Court’s decisions leading
up to, including, and following Brown.
Relatedly, the Court may affect public opinion in ways that it
later invokes in order to maintain constitutional commitments it had
previously made. An example is the Court’s invocation in Grutter v.
Bollinger of a widespread societal commitment to “diversity,”81 an
ostensibly non-remedial justification for affirmative action that Justice
Powell fashioned in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke82 at
a time when universities were expressly defending affirmative action
admissions programs on remedial grounds.83 Another example is the
Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda v. Arizona84 in Dickerson v. United
States.85 The Court there declared—in a majority opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, no previous friend of Miranda—that “Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture.”86
Reciprocal legitimation is like the foregoing phenomena in that
the Court invokes changes that it played a part in causing without
78. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting).
79. For discussion of the difficulties encountered in trying to discern the impact of Court
decisions on public opinion, see Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3, 8–14 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
80. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967).
81. 539 U.S. 306, 328–32 (2003).
82. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
83. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473,
1489 (2007) (documenting the efforts of the University of California in Bakke to justify affirmative
action in higher education in terms of the remedial logic of past discrimination).
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Dickerson was itself the product of an interaction between the
Supreme Court and extrajudicial actors. See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 61–65.
86. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. The Court has undermined Miranda in other ways. See
generally Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010).
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candidly admitting as much. Reciprocal legitimation is distinct,
however, in that it involves a particular kind of relationship that the
Court establishes with other federal courts when it perceives threats to
its public legitimacy, and so is less common. The next Section
documents instances in which the Court forged—or did not forge—such
a relationship.
B. Public Legitimacy
There is a second way in which the Court’s conduct in Windsor
and Obergefell is generalizable. When the Court intervenes to decide a
question on which American constitutional culture is deeply divided,
the Court often takes measures to safeguard its public legitimacy.87
Public legitimacy is distinct from legal legitimacy because each “is
constituted by its collective acceptance” in the minds of a distinct
audience.88 As Professor Richard Fallon has explained, “When
legitimacy functions as a legal concept, legitimacy and illegitimacy are
gauged by legal norms.”89 “As measured by sociological criteria,” Fallon
continues, “the Constitution or a claim of legal authority is legitimate
insofar as it is accepted . . . as deserving of respect or obedience—or . . .
is otherwise acquiesced in.”90 Public legitimacy turns on whether nonlegal actors, including the general public, different regions of the
country, and government officials, view judicial decisions as deserving
of respect or obedience or otherwise acquiesce in them.91

87. For discussion, see generally Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 959 (2008). Of course, the Court may not succeed. For example, scholars still debate the
efficacy of the Brown Court’s actions.
88. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 117–18 (1995)
(“[I]nstitutions survive on acceptance.”).
89. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790
(2005).
90. Id. at 1790–91; see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001):
[T]he work of constitutional judges must have both “legal” and “social” legitimacy.
Social legitimacy, as distinguished from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential
antecedents of constitutional decisions and asks whether those decisions are widely
understood to be the correct ones given the social and economic milieu in which they
are rendered.
(footnote omitted).
91. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 83, at 1473 (observing that the law can be apprehended
“from the internal perspective of a faithful practitioner and from the external perspective of the
general public,” and that “if the social legitimacy of the law as a public institution resides in the
latter, the legal legitimacy of the law as a principled unfolding of professional reason inheres in
the former”).
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One way in which the Court may seek to shore up its public
legitimacy is by participating in the process of reciprocal legitimation,
which may initially be either intentional or unintentional. This Section
canvasses a successful instance of intended reciprocal legitimation, a
successful instance of unintended reciprocal legitimation, and a recent
failure to achieve reciprocal legitimation that may or may not have
initially been intended.
Before beginning the case studies, it is important to note that
whether the words of a judicial opinion have any particular empirical
effect, such as enhancing the public legitimacy of the issuing court,
depends upon what Professor J.L. Austin called the perlocutionary force
of those words. Austin observed that the perlocutionary force of speech
turns on “what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as
convincing, persuading, [or] deterring.”92 The perlocutionary force of a
judicial opinion is a matter of contingent causality that depends, among
other things, upon how exactly the court speaks. For the Court’s speech
to affect its public legitimacy, it is not necessary to assume that the
public carefully parses Supreme Court opinions. Rather, it is necessary
to assume only that the content of the Court’s opinion is relevant to the
perlocutionary effect of its speech. It is no doubt true that the meaning
of the Court’s opinions is conveyed to the public in complex, highly
mediated ways.
1. The Segregation Cases
The Brown Court sought to protect its public legitimacy in
numerous familiar ways. It set the case for re-argument twice, and it
expended great efforts to publicly project unanimity even though the
Justices were divided. The Court also expressly limited the holding to
education (as noted above), did not moralize about a moral issue, and
allowed desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”93
The Brown Court took those actions because it was concerned
about the extent to which Southern politicians and citizens would
comply with federal court orders to desegregate Southern public
schools. The Court was less troubled by the prospect that a broader
ruling condemning all state-mandated segregation would be
unconvincing to legal professionals. Indeed, because purporting to limit
92. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 108 (2d ed. 1975).
93. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 682 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting Chief Justice Warren
as explaining to his colleagues at the conference after re-argument that it would be “[u]nfortunate
if we had to take precipitous action that would inflame more than necessary”). See generally, e.g.,
id. at 545–750 (discussing the Brown litigation when it reached the U.S. Supreme Court).
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Brown’s rationale to education predictably subjected the Court to harsh
criticism from legal luminaries,94 the Court was willing to sacrifice a
portion of its legal legitimacy in order to shore up its public legitimacy.
Reciprocal legitimation concerns threats that the Court may at times
perceive to its public legitimacy, not its legal legitimacy. The Brown
Court was most concerned about protecting its public legitimacy, as was
the Windsor Court when it declined to rule more broadly—say, by
holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation triggers
heightened scrutiny.95
Brown is an extreme case because the Court perceived that its
public legitimacy was under extreme stress. But evidence of similar
behavior is discernible in Windsor and Obergefell. As documented in the
previous Part, the Court’s opinion in Windsor may have been designed
to set in motion the process of reciprocal legitimation, and, in any event,
that is what happened: the Court and other federal courts invoked one
another as authority in attempting to legitimate a controversial
decision in the face of divided public opinion. That strategy is
potentially risky for the Court because other federal courts may decline
the Court’s invitation. But they also may accept it, as Windsor and
Obergefell illustrate.
Notably, the reciprocal legitimation technique is also
exemplified (albeit with an important twist) by Brown, the subsequent
federal court decisions that expanded the scope of the Court’s holding
in Brown to racial segregation in other public settings, and the Court’s
per curiams that validated the expansion. As noted, the Court decided
Brown in a way that self-consciously did not necessarily condemn all de
jure racial segregation, all racial classifications, or all practices of racial
subordination.96 During the opinion drafting process, Chief Justice
Warren rejected a proposed addition offered by Justice Jackson because
Warren “felt it could be interpreted as being directed toward
segregation in general, not only in public education.”97 Warren wrote
that the Court was limiting the rationale to education even though he
clearly knew that the basic issue was much broader, and that the Court
was encouraging litigants and federal judges to read it broadly. Among
94. Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler were perhaps the two most prominent critics of
Brown in the American legal community. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1959) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
54 (1958)).
95. Matters are more complex for interpretive theories that render public legitimacy part of
legal legitimacy. The account offered here assumes they are separable, at least at a given point in
time.
96. See supra note 57 (quoting the Brown Court’s limitation of its holding to education).
97. KLUGER, supra note 93, at 701.
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other things, Plessy v. Ferguson, whose reasoning the Court was
rejecting, involved segregation in railroad cars.98 And almost
immediately after Brown, the Court vacated the judgment of an
appellate court that had upheld segregation in municipal recreational
facilities and remanded for reconsideration in light of Brown.99
In short order, many other federal courts leaned on the authority
of Brown in expanding the scope of its holding to segregation in other
public spaces in Southern life100—for example, public beaches and
bathhouses,101 intrastate bus systems,102 and public parks and golf
courses.103 In response, the Court leaned on those federal court
decisions so heavily that it did not issue opinions and offer its own
reasons. Instead, the Court simply affirmed the decisions summarily
with citations to Brown,104 while infamously postponing consideration
of the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws.105 Fearful that
giving reasons or condemning anti-miscegenation statutes so soon after
Brown would only make Southern resistance more massive, the Court
waited eleven years to speak loudly in Loving.106 In the interim, the
Court’s legitimacy became more secure,107 and so the Court developed

98. 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896).
99. See Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (mem.) (per curiam),
vacating and remanding 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
100. Of course, federal courts also leaned on the authority of Brown in enforcing the decision.
See generally, e.g., JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (documenting the federal judges—
especially on the Fifth Circuit—who implemented Brown in six Southern states); KLUGER, supra
note 93, at 749 (“[P]ractically speaking, [the Court] placed effective control of the undertaking in
the hands of Southerners themselves—the fifty-eight federal judges manning the twenty-eight
United States District Courts and two Courts of Appeals circuits, the Fourth and the Fifth, serving
the South.”).
101. See Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386, 386–87 (4th Cir.
1955).
102. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
103. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir.
1958).
104. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (mem.) (per
curiam), aff’g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam), aff’g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); see also Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam) (desegregating municipal golf courses by
requiring the district court to enter a decree in conformity with Dawson), vacating and remanding
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
105. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a
properly presented federal question a constitutional challenge to Virginia’s ban on interracial
marriage).
106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Loving).
107. For discussion of the significant changes in American society between 1954 and 1967 that
helped legitimate Brown, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 214–15 (2012).
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sufficient confidence to write per curiam opinions invalidating
segregation in various settings.108 Exuding self-confidence in Loving,
the Court reinterpreted Brown as having condemned racial
classifications that reinforce inferior social status.109
2. The Reapportionment Cases
Another example of reciprocal legitimation, albeit one that was
not initially intended, is the reapportionment decisions of the 1960s,
which were decided in the shadow of massive resistance to Brown. Prior
to the 1960s, many state legislatures were severely malapportioned,
with districts of vastly different populations. As cities and suburbs grew
in population, election districts were not redrawn to reflect the
population changes. For example, fifty thousand people might elect a
representative in one district while two hundred and fifty thousand
people in another district elected a representative to the same
legislature. The same malapportionment problem existed in
congressional districts in states across the country.110
Writing in 1946 for the Court in Colegrove v. Green, Justice
Frankfurter admonished that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political
thicket” of legislative reapportionment, lest the public legitimacy of the
court be imperiled.111 By 1961, his position had not changed, and he
attempted to sway Justice Stewart to his side while Baker v. Carr112
was pending before the Court. He wrote to Justice Stewart that judicial
108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (“[I]t is no longer open
to question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities. Statecompelled segregation in a court of justice is a manifest violation of the State’s duty to deny no one
the equal protection of its laws.” (citations to Brown and subsequent decisions omitted)); Turner
v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1962) (per curiam) (holding that statutes and regulation
articulating state policy promoting racial segregation in public restaurants violates the Fourteenth
Amendment).
109. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”); see also
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1478–80 (2004) (demonstrating that the
anticlassification and antisubordination principles were understood to be closely connected in the
years before and after Brown). Loving reflects the ambiguity present in Brown and Bolling
regarding what sort of mediating principle of equality the Court was enforcing. On that question,
as opposed to the geographic scope of the no-segregation principle, the Brown Court was unlikely
to have been intending reciprocal legitimation because the Court, like the broader legal
community, was unable to clearly discern that potentially competing principles were at stake until
subsequent disputes arose over disparate impact and affirmative action.
110. For a recent discussion of this history by the Court, see Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120,
1123–24 (2016).
111. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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intervention threatened to “bring the Court in conflict with political
forces and exacerbate political feelings widely throughout the Nation on
a larger scale, though not so pathologically, as the Segregation cases
have stirred.”113 Justice Frankfurter would later write in dissent in
Baker that “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor
the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction.”114 “Such feeling,” he continued, “must be nourished by the
Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political
entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of
political forces in political settlements.”115
Justice Frankfurter failed to persuade Justice Stewart, and the
Court forged ahead over Justice Frankfurter’s objections,
notwithstanding reasonable concerns that state legislatures or
Congress might not comply with federal court orders to reapportion.116
In responding to reapportionment cases, the Court proceeded in stages.
First, it held in Baker v. Carr only that reapportionment challenges
were justiciable, leaving it to other courts to initially decide whether to
insist upon population equality, something close to equality with
permissible deviations for sufficient cause, mere rationality, or some
other standard.117 In rejecting the applicability of the political question
doctrine, Justice Brennan wrote in part for the majority that “[j]udicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they
must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action.”118 The Solicitor General and counsel for the plaintiffs

113. J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE
SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 80 (2014); see id. at
83 (noting that, at the second argument in Baker, Justice Frankfurter warned that judicial
intervention in segregation cases would prove “simpler” than intervention in reapportionment
would be, and that he rhetorically asked Solicitor General Archibald Cox whether he thought “the
prejudices on this business of urban versus rural, which is just as strong in New York as it is in
Tennessee, isn’t even more deep-seated and more pervasively deep-seated”).
114. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. For descriptions of the fraught political context in which the Court operated, see GuyUriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive
Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115–22 (2002); Mark V. Tushnet, Law and
Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political
Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1231–32 (2002).
117. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
118. Id. at 226.

1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1208

5/1/2017 1:59 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1183

had urged the Court to adopt a deferential approach.119 At that point,
however, the Court was deciding only the question of justiciability.
Although “[s]ome commentators criticized the Court for laying
down no more specific guidelines for lower courts to follow,” Professor
Gordon Baker, writing in 1966, opined that the Court’s forbearance
“may have been a calculated and perceptive move.”120 “By letting state
and lower Federal courts tackle the specific problems in particular
states,” Baker explained, “the supreme tribunal would be able to gauge
the reactions—both political and judicial—before moving farther.”121 He
added that the Court “must have been impressed with the ensuing flood
of litigation,” as well as with “the alacrity with which many lower court
judges moved to correct alleged malapportionments.”122 Political
scientist Martin Shapiro was less pleased with the Court, opining that
it “has, in a sense, not kept its word to those of its defenders who have
relied on the initially limited arguments” and that “[i]t remains to be
seen whether or not the tactical advantage gained by its ‘delayed action’
approach will compensate for the Court’s loss of that precious political
asset, a reputation for candor.”123
Judging from the inside account of the Court’s deliberations
recently offered by Professor J. Gordon Smith, however, the reason the
Court decided only the issue of justiciability in Baker appears to have
had much to do with unstable internal Court dynamics.124 Justice
Brennan initially needed Justice Stewart’s vote in order to secure a
majority, and Justice Stewart did not want to decide more than the
issue of justiciability. Whatever the reasons for Justice Stewart’s
minimalism (among other possibilities, perhaps Justice Frankfurter’s
lobbying took a toll), Justice Brennan no longer required Justice
Stewart’s vote when Justice Clark changed his mind after
unsuccessfully attempting to write a dissent. What is more, Justice
Clark expressed willingness to decide not only the issue of justiciability,
but also the merits. After talking with Chief Justice Warren, however,
Justice Brennan decided not to redraft the majority opinion so late in
the term. Perhaps Justice Brennan did not push for a broader ruling at
119. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Reconsidered, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 485, 503 (2015) (explaining the litigation positions of the parties and the Court’s response).
120. GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 123–24 (1966).
121. Id. at 124.
122. Id.
123. MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO
POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 250–52 (1964). Shapiro was criticizing both Brown and Baker.
124. This paragraph draws from SMITH, supra note 113, at 86–89. For a similar account, see
BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 1953-1969, at 183–98 (1983).
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least in part because he perceived strategic advantage in delay—
whether because he had intended reciprocal legitimation in mind, or
because he did not want to alienate Justice Stewart. It also seems likely,
however, that the Court would have issued a broader ruling had Justice
Clark initially joined the majority. Moreover, there were not yet five
votes for “one person, one vote,”125 so the Court could not then have been
proceeding with that ultimate objective in mind.
Whatever the best explanation for the limited nature of the
Court’s intervention in Baker, the “short-term response” to it was
“nothing short of astonishing.”126 Writing in 1962, Professor Robert
McCloskey observed that “[n]ot only federal judges, but state judges as
well, have taken the inch or so of encouragement offered by the
Supreme Court and stretched it out to a mile,” for “[l]egislatures all over
the country have been bidden to redistrict or to face the prospect of
having the judiciary do the job for them.”127 In all, there were “more
than seventy legislative and congressional reapportionment lawsuits
filed in forty states in the aftermath of Baker v. Carr.”128 Baker set in
motion a process, the next phase of which entailed federal and state
judges leaning on its authority in moving toward population equality.
The final phase began when those decisions returned to the
Court. Over the next few years, the Court decided the merits of various
apportionment scenarios, roughly in order from least controversial to
most controversial. In Gray v. Sanders,129 the Court invalidated
Georgia’s primary election law and county unit system.130 Writing for
the Court, Justice Douglas declared that “[t]he conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”131 In Wesberry v.
125. SMITH, supra note 113, at 216 (“Five votes for the more sweeping standard did not exist
prior to the confirmation of Byron White and Arthur Goldberg.”); id. (“As late as 1962, almost no
one involved in reapportionment litigation even contemplated population equality in both houses
of a bicameral legislature.”).
126. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term—Foreword: The Reapportionment
Cases, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1962). This piece contains a long footnote, see id. at 56–58 n.14,
that reports on then-pending litigation and legislative action in the wake of Baker.
127. Id. at 57–58.
128. SMITH, supra note 113, at 139.
129. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
130. Georgia’s law “technically governed the running of primaries for statewide offices such as
governor, lieutenant governor, and U.S. senator. But in practice it ensured that a rural minority
maintained almost absolute control of the urbanizing state.” SMITH, supra note 113, at 103–04.
131. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381; see id. at 382 (Harlan, J., dissenting):
When [Baker] was argued at the last Term we were assured that if this Court would
only remove the roadblocks of [Colegrove] and its predecessors to judicial review in
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Sanders, the Court turned its attention to the House of
Representatives,132 agreeing with the dissenter on the three-judge
district court, who had “relied on Baker v. Carr.”133 In a majority opinion
written by Justice Black, the Court held that “as nearly as is practicable
one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another’s.”134
More controversially, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court expanded
the scope of the principle of population equality to state legislative
districts.135 The Court held that, “as a basic constitutional standard, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis.”136 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren observed that
“[t]he spate of similar cases filed and decided by lower courts since our
decision in Baker amply shows that the problem of state legislative
malapportionment is one that is perceived to exist in a large number of
the States.”137 The Court added in a footnote that “[l]itigation
challenging the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment
schemes had been instituted in at least 34 States prior to the end of
1962—within nine months of our decision in Baker v. Carr.”138
The Court in Reynolds v. Sims did not expressly cite numerous
federal and state court decisions as authority for its own resolution, as
it did in Obergefell. As just noted, however, the Court did lean on federal
and state court decisions in documenting the scope of the “problem . . .
that is perceived to exist.” The Court did not acknowledge that Baker
likely played a role in producing that perception, even as the Court
observed that those decisions were rendered after Baker. As Professor
Gordon Baker reported, moreover, “the ‘consensus of lower courts’ in
“electoral” cases, this Court in all likelihood would never have to get deeper into such
matters. State legislatures, it was predicted, would be prodded into taking satisfactory
action by the mere prospect of legal proceedings. These predictions have not proved
true.
132. The constitutional text defeated application of the principle of “one person, one vote” to
the U.S. Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. For a discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1283–85 (2015).
133. 376 U.S. 1, 4 (1964).
134. Id. at 7–8.
135. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
136. Id. at 568; see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 734–37
(1964) (requiring population equality in the apportionment of districts in both houses of a
bicameral legislature, regardless of whether a majority of the state electorate approves an
apportionment scheme that deviates from population equality in one house).
137. Sims, 377 U.S. at 556.
138. Id. at 556 n.30 (citing, inter alia, Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts:
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 706–10 (1963), and emphasizing
that it “contains an appendix summarizing reapportionment litigation through the end of 1962”).
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moving toward representative equality” was a major theme of oral
arguments in reapportionment cases that term.139 Thus, the
reapportionment cases appear to be another instance in which the
Court intervened in stages and interacted dialectically, not simply
hierarchically, with other federal (and state) courts.
In another way, the majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims quietly
sought to ameliorate threats to the Court’s public legitimacy. Chief
Justice Warren offered the reassurance that controversies over
reapportionment did not simply involve “urban-rural conflicts,”
notwithstanding how they “are generally viewed.” This was because
“fast-growing suburban areas . . . are probably the most seriously
underrepresented in many of our state legislatures,” and because
“[m]alapportionment can, and has historically, run in various
directions.”140 Those observations were irrelevant to the constitutional
question, as Warren acknowledged.141 But he included them anyway.142
3. A Failure of Reciprocal Legitimation:
The Second Amendment Cases
The Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence is an area in
which, at least so far, reciprocal legitimation has failed to
materialize.143 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm,
including a handgun, in the home for purposes of self-defense.144 Two
years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the
right declared in Heller satisfies the requirements for incorporation and
so applies to the states.145
In the wake of those decisions, federal district and circuit courts
have almost always rejected Second Amendment claims. “Regardless of
the level of scrutiny that has been applied,” the Law Center to Prevent
Gun Violence reports, “nearly all of these [post-Heller] cases have one
139. BAKER, supra note 120, at 125.
140. Sims, 377 U.S. at 567 n.43.
141. See id.
142. Reynolds v. Sims generated a political firestorm that included various threatened
responses, including a proposed constitutional amendment that would have partially reversed the
result. The proposal fell just short of passage by the Senate in 1965, and all other efforts to reverse
the decision “failed and failed quickly.” HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOLUME II: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 569 (2013).
143. Another such example is United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For a discussion,
see generally Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What
if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369.
144. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
145. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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thing in common: the Second Amendment challenge has been rejected
and the statute at issue has been upheld.”146 “Of the more than 900
cases tracked by the Law Center,” this source continues, “96% have
rejected the Second Amendment Challenge.”147 Based in part on the
data, Professor Richard Re describes Heller as having “been narrowed
from below.”148
It is not clear, however, what the Court in Heller and McDonald
was intending to accomplish. It is possible that the story to date of those
decisions is one in which the federal courts have largely rejected the
Supreme Court’s invitation to expand the scope of Second Amendment
rights. As an initial matter, the Court may have had judicial legitimacy
on its “mind.” Although in 2008 there was significant public support for
some form of Second Amendment right,149 the Court was significantly
changing constitutional law when it declared for the first time in
American history that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right of firearm possession in the home for self-defense purposes. The
consequences of such a declaration for the prevention of crime, mass
killings, accidents, and suicides were far from certain.
It is also possible that the Court was attempting to move the
federal courts in the direction of a relatively robust understanding of
Second Amendment rights without yet requiring them to enforce such
an understanding. Writing for the majority in Heller, Justice Scalia
emphasized, for example, that “whatever else [the Second Amendment]
leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests
the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.”150 He also declared it “not debatable” that “it is not
the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”151
Those statements may have been intended to encourage the federal
courts in an opinion that was self-conscious not to “clarify the entire
field”152 or “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full
146. Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 6 (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-March2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5K8-TN7B].
147. Id.
148. Re, supra note 13, at 961–63.
149. According to a USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted in February 2008, “A solid majority of
the U.S. public, 73%, believes the Second Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the rights of
Americans to own guns. Twenty percent believe the amendment only guarantees the rights of state
militia members to own guns.” Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own
Guns, GALLUP (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-AmericansRight-Own-Guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/LF53-P8DB].
150. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
151. Id. at 636.
152. Id. at 635.

1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/1/2017 1:59 PM

RECIPROCAL LEGITIMATION

1213

scope of the Second Amendment.”153 Most significantly, the Court did
not announce a level of scrutiny or indicate whether the right to possess
a firearm for purposes of self-defense extends outside the home. Those
questions, and others, were left to federal district and circuit courts, as
well as state courts.
The Court also included qualifications in its opinion that can
perhaps be understood to reflect the fact that the Court was only
attempting to persuade other federal courts for the time being instead
of coercing them. The Court stated that
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.154

The Court also “recognize[d] another important limitation on the right
to keep and carry arms”—namely, that “the sorts of weapons protected
were those ‘in common use at the time,’ ” a limitation that the Court
thought was “fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’ ”155
An alternative interpretation of the foregoing evidence,
however, is that Heller and McDonald were compromises among the
Justices in the majority and that the qualifications Justice Scalia
included were the price of a fifth vote (and perhaps a fourth as well).
Notably, Heller, like United States v. Lopez,156 was a case in which the
lower courts moved the law first and forced the Court’s hand.157 There
apparently were, and continue to be, significant disagreements among
the members of the Heller majority. In recent years, fractures within
that majority have been aired publicly with increasing frequency.
Recently, the Court held narrowly (and without briefing or argument)
that the explanation offered by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in upholding a state law prohibiting the possession of
stun guns contradicted Heller and McDonald. The Court merely
vacated the judgment of the state court and remanded for further

153. Id. at 626.
154. Id. at 626–27.
155. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
156. See supra note 143 (noting that Lopez is another instance in which lower federal courts
have declined to expand the scope of the Court’s decision).
157. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367–68 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that federal
statute banning gun possession on school grounds was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause);
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the District of
Columbia’s restrictions on firearms violated the Second Amendment).
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proceedings.158 By contrast, Justice Alito, in an opinion joined by Justice
Thomas, concurred only in the judgment, criticizing “[t]his Court’s
grudging per curiam,” which “now sends the case back to that same
court.”159 The Court had not previously granted certiorari in a Second
Amendment case in the wake of Heller and McDonald, and it sometimes
denied certiorari over public dissents.160
One lesson of Heller and McDonald is that there will be
situations in which one cannot know, at least not yet, how best to
understand majority opinions that seemingly point in different
directions in circumstances in which the Court may be concerned about
its public legitimacy. As Professor Martin Shapiro’s misinterpretation
of Baker suggests,161 such situations are most likely to arise when the
decisions are recent and so internal evidence of the Court’s
deliberations is unavailable. It seems unlikely, however, that one will
always be in that situation. There is persuasive evidence, discussed
above, indicating what the Brown Court was attempting to accomplish.
And although a cautionary tale of this Part is that one cannot be equally
confident about judicial motivations regarding recent events, there has
been no indication to date (even as it remains possible) that the majority
in Windsor was internally divided in a way suggesting that the decision
was a compromise, as opposed to an invitation. Unlike the situation in
Baker, moreover, it seems improbable that there were vote switches
while Windsor was pending before the Court.
4. Falsification
The foregoing case studies involve different categories of
reciprocal legitimation or else its absence. They also implicate a variety
of potential kinds of evidence of intended or unintended reciprocal
legitimation, including the level of public controversy over an issue, the
sequencing of judicial opinions by different courts, a close textual
158. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per curiam). According to the per
curiam opinion, even though the Court in Heller had held that the Second Amendment right
extends to arms that did not exist at the time of the Founding and to arms that are not useful in
warfare, the state court held that stun guns are outside the scope of the Second Amendment right
because they were not in common use when the amendment was ratified and because they are not
adaptable for use in the military. See id.
159. Id. at 1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
160. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(“Despite these holdings [in Heller and McDonald], several Courts of Appeals—including the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the decision below—have upheld categorical bans on firearms
that millions of Americans commonly own for lawful purposes.”).
161. See supra text accompanying note 123 (quoting Shapiro).
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analysis of the reasoning and citations in those opinions, and (where
available) the Court’s internal deliberations. Finally, the case studies
involve differences in the potential threats to the Court’s public
legitimacy, including dangers emanating from the general public, the
populations of particular regions of the country, and government
officials. What binds the examples together and makes them at least
potential candidates for reciprocal legitimation is the particular threestage sequencing of judicial decisions by different courts in a judicial
hierarchy in circumstances in which the public legitimacy of those
courts may be perceived by the judges to be in question. Specifically, the
Supreme Court in the initial stage decides less than it is authorized to
decide while potentially signaling to the lower courts that they should
expand the scope of the Court’s holding at the second stage. If lower
courts do so and invoke the Court’s initial decision as authority, and if
the Court validates the expansion and invokes those lower court
decisions as authority, then it seems likely, although not certain, that
reciprocal legitimation has taken place.
As noted at the end of Part I, it can no doubt be difficult to falsify
such a conclusion. But it is not in principle impossible. For example,
judges may speak in an extrajudicial capacity about what they were
intending to accomplish or avoid, and their internal deliberations may
eventually become available. In addition, alternative explanations for
why a judicial opinion is written in a certain way may be viewed as more
or less persuasive. And good empiricists may fashion creative ways of
testing the causal relationships—between the initial Supreme Court
decision and lower court decisions, and then between those lower court
decisions and the ultimate Supreme Court decision—that are part of a
claim of reciprocal legitimation. In any event, a theoretical account of
occasional judicial behavior can be informative even if it is difficult to
falsify. Such an account can be useful when the evidence for it is at least
suggestive and it is among the best accounts of an observable practice
that are currently available, even if one cannot be certain about its
accuracy.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNT AND EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
This Part identifies two implications of the account of reciprocal
legitimation offered in this Article for scholarship about the federal
courts in law and political science. The first implication concerns the
processes of constitutional change, which include a greater role for the
agency of judges than is recognized in several prominent accounts in
the literature. The second implication concerns the nature of the
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relationship between the Supreme Court and other federal courts,
which at certain times is more dialectical and less top-down or bottomup than is commonly supposed.
This Part also identifies extensions of the model of judicial
interactions proposed here. The model can be expanded to include state
courts and non-judicial actors. It can also be extended to include certain
judicial phenomena that can blend into reciprocal legitimation—
specifically, experimentation and learning.
A. The (Judicial) Processes of Constitutional Change
Prominent theorists of constitutional change disagree about how
such change takes place. According to Professor Bruce Ackerman,
constitutional change occurs rarely and over relatively short periods of
time. Ackerman has developed a descriptive and normative theory of
“constitutional moments,” according to which Americans live in a
“dualist democracy.” During pivotal periods in American history,
Ackerman argues, ordinary politics is displaced by a constitutional
politics in which a movement party in control of one branch of the
national government defeats opposition expressed by another branch
and succeeds in persuading the American people to amend the
Constitution outside the Article V process of formal amendment.
Whereas the Republican Congress was in command during
Reconstruction (and it subdued President Andrew Johnson and the
Supreme Court), President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led
constitutional change during the New Deal (and he eventually defeated
the Court).162
By contrast, other theorists understand constitutional change as
occurring relatively frequently and incrementally over potentially
longer periods of time. For example, Professors Jack Balkin and
Sanford Levinson have articulated a descriptive theory of “partisan
entrenchment” to explain routine, gradual changes in constitutional
law that they believe are characteristic of how the American
constitutional system functions. According to their theory, the
president’s power to nominate Justices and other federal judges means
that the party controlling the White House can, if it chooses, appoint
federal judges with roughly similar ideological orientations on issues of
greatest significance to the party (subject to a potential check from the
162. For Ackerman’s comprehensive work on this theory, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998), and 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
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Senate). Over time, that process can produce substantial changes in
constitutional law.163
Because those two theories differ over the primary mechanism
and pace of constitutional change, they also differ in the extent to which
they regard constitutional change as democratic. Ackerman views
constitutional moments as embodying democratic self-governance
because they involve focused efforts by the American people to refashion
the meaning of important parts of the Constitution. For Balkin and
Levinson, by contrast, constitutional change is only roughly democratic
because it tends to unfold over an extended period of time, and there is
typically a lag between when the governing party decides what it wants
to accomplish and when the federal courts respond. The two theories
also have different objectives. Whereas Ackerman is concerned to
establish both how constitutional change occurs and when it is
legitimate, Balkin and Levinson purport only to describe how it
happens.
For all of those differences between the theories, they share an
important similarity. For both, it is political actors, not legal actors, who
primarily drive constitutional change. That is especially true of
Ackerman. His focus is on presidents, Congresses, and their associated
social movements, which either tame each other or the Court. He is
explicit that he is not interested in “judges talking to one another about
the relationship of past decisions to present problems.”164 Indeed,
because Ackerman is a kind of originalist (with more, and more recent,
Foundings to account for than most originalists), his judges play a
preservationist and synthetic role; neither his descriptive nor his
normative story acknowledges the phenomenon of judicial politics or
imagines that judges can play a leading role in constitutional
development.165
Federal judges play substantially more of a role in producing
constitutional change in Balkin and Levinson’s theory of partisan
entrenchment: judges are the ones who are entrenched by partisans in
the White House and, potentially, the Senate. For Balkin and Levinson
as well, however, political actors are the primary drivers of
constitutional change. Balkin and Levinson emphasize the role of the
163. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001).
164. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 162, at 20.
165. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 48 (2007)
(“The possibility of judicial politics or the judiciary as an active agent of constitutional development
creates severe problems for his normative and historical narrative, and Ackerman takes pains to
marginalize it.”).

1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1218

5/1/2017 1:59 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4:1183

governing political coalition, whose bidding judges may eventually do.
For them, in other words, judges are agents, not principals.
Like Balkin and Levinson, Professor Barry Friedman offers a
positive theory, not a normative one. Also like them, he focuses on the
agency of forces outside the judiciary in shaping constitutional law.
Specifically, Friedman argues—in line with a large literature,166 but
more exhaustively—that the Supreme Court follows public opinion, at
least in general, over the long run, and on salient issues.167 Similar to
Balkin and Levinson’s theory, each of those qualifications leaves some
room for the Court’s own agency.168 Friedman’s basic point, however, is
that the Court is acted upon far more frequently than it acts.
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel situate courts in a more
active role. They have developed their theory of “democratic
constitutionalism” to explain and “express the paradox that
constitutional authority depends on both its democratic responsiveness
and its legitimacy as law.”169 “Americans,” they write, “want their
Constitution to have the authority of law, and they understand law to
be distinct from politics.”170 Moreover, “they understand that the rule of
law is rooted in professional practices,” including those of judges, “that
are distinct from popular politics.”171 Even so, Post and Siegel stress—
and this is their main point—that if the public comes to view the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution as wholly
unresponsive to popular commitments, then “the American people will
in time come to regard it as illegitimate and oppressive, and they will
act to repudiate it as they did during the New Deal.”172 Post and Siegel,

166. The seminal work is Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). More recent examples include THOMAS
R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989), and THOMAS R. MARSHALL,
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008).
167. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
168. See Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV.
583, 595 (“All of Friedman’s qualifications are well conceived, but each pays tribute to the very
[counter-majoritarian] difficulty he means to deny.”).
169. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020, at 25, 27 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (emphases omitted) [hereinafter Post
& Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism]. For a more elaborate development of their theory, see
generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
170. Post & Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note 169, at 27.
171. Id. at 27–28.
172. Id. at 28; see also id. at 25–26 (writing that “important aspects of American constitutional
law evolve in response to substantive constitutional visions that the American people have
mobilized to realize,” and that “these responsive features of the law help sustain the Constitution’s
authority in history”).
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like Balkin in his more recent work on living originalism,173 seek to
provide an account that encompasses the influence of both judicial and
non-judicial actors on the fashioning of constitutional law. Their
emphasis, however, is more on the responsiveness of constitutional
judges to democratic forces than it is on the capacity of such judges to
shape constitutional politics.
There is a sense in which all of these theories are obviously
correct to focus on extrajudicial actors. Throughout American history,
changes in political commitments have led to changes in constitutional
law in various ways. First, Article V amendments are rare but have
sometimes proven possible. Second, electoral politics results in acts of
constitutional interpretation and institution building by the political
branches, as well as the appointment of judges, as Balkin and Levinson
explain. Third, segments of the public may engage in efforts to change
social norms, whether through social movement advocacy, litigation, or
both. Fourth, norm contestation may also occur through the rhetoric of
presidents and other influential politicians. “To succeed in changing
social norms,” Balkin has more recently observed, “may be as powerful
as changing judges and politicians, for it alters the underlying sense of
what is reasonable and unreasonable for governments to do. It shifts
political and professional discourse about what is off-the-wall and onthe-wall in making claims on the Constitution.”174 For example, during
the period extending from Windsor to Obergefell, the Supreme Court
and other federal courts were deciding same-sex marriage cases in a
context in which public opinion was moving—with remarkable
dispatch—in the same direction as almost all of those courts. In that
respect, Obergefell is not a counter-majoritarian decision.
Even so, the Court did not simply validate a national consensus
by bringing outliers into line.175 Throughout the relevant period,
American culture remained regionally divided over the legitimacy of
same-sex marriage. Indeed, public opinion remains divided today.176
Accordingly, Obergefell was an anti-federalist decision: if not for the
173. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 70–72 & 360 n.8 (2011) (embracing democratic
constitutionalism not only as an accurate descriptive account, as Post & Siegel do, but also as a
normative account of why the constitutional system possesses democratic legitimacy).
174. Id. at 71.
175. For a discussion of constitutional outliers and guidelines for proper use of the term, see
Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014).
176. In a Gallup poll conducted May 4–8, 2016, thirty-seven percent of respondents expressed
the view that same-sex marriage should not be recognized by the law as valid, sixty-one percent
expressed the opposite view, and two percent had no opinion. Marriage, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/Marriage.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
66JJ-P8J4].
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intervention of the federal courts, most states would likely prohibit
same-sex marriage today. Given that reality, it is insufficient to look
nearly exclusively at political actors, social movements, or public
opinion in explaining how constitutional change occurred.
According to the account offered in this Article, legal elites—
judges—played a prominent role in bringing about and legitimating
constitutional change. They neither enforced the Constitution as
amended in the most recent constitutional moment, nor vindicated the
constitutional commitments of the governing political coalition that
installed certain judges and Justices in the late 1980s and early
1990s.177 Indeed, contrary to the partisan entrenchment thesis, the
Appendix to this Article documents that Republican appointees in the
Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits voted to invalidate federal
or state restrictions on same-sex marriage. Only the voting by panel
members on the Sixth and Ninth Circuits conformed to partisanshipbased predictions without exception.
Nor did judges who voted to invalidate prohibitions on same-sex
marriage simply follow public opinion or deeply felt popular
commitments. Although those judges did respond to significant, more
recent changes in cultural values, they also likely played a role in
causing those changes. And they did so in part by working together and
orchestrating events behind the scenes—by leaning on one another for
support as they intervened in the conflict over same-sex marriage.178
Justices drew support from other federal judges who in turn had drawn
support from them, all the while normalizing in the public
consciousness the idea that same-sex marriage is constitutionally
protected through media reports of repeated (indeed, seemingly daily)
judicial invalidations. Theories of constitutional change are incomplete
to the extent that they, like many other participants and observers, do
not recognize the fascinating interaction between the Supreme Court
and other federal courts that recently took place.

177. Ackerman’s theory does not seem able to capture the forces that produced Obergefell.
Balkin and Levinson’s theory can account for the role of the Sotomayor and Kagan confirmations,
and those of recently appointed federal judges who voted to invalidate state bans on same-sex
marriage.
178. Cf. Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 731 (2012)
(“[C]onstitutional change and political and social mobilizations are so intertwined that, in
interpreting and applying legal doctrine, judges are influenced by—and, in turn, influence—
notions about constitutional meaning that originate outside the courts.”).
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B. The Federal Courts System
Much scholarship in law and political science has long studied
the Supreme Court without regard for its relationship to other courts,
or else has understood the Court and other federal courts to relate
hierarchically.179 A famous example of a scholar who studied the Court
in relative isolation is Alexander Bickel, who had only the Court in mind
when he advocated that it deploy the “passive virtues,” such as creative
application of standing doctrine, in order to protect legal principles from
being warped by the need to maintain the public legitimacy of the
Court.180 At the end of a long chapter in the same book that coined the
phrase “the countermajoritarian difficulty” (thereby helping spawn a
cottage industry in constitutional theory for the next half century),
Bickel noted that “I have not addressed myself, in this chapter or
elsewhere, to the role of the lower federal courts, of which the Supreme
Court is the hierarchical head.”181 For Bickel, the relevant
“conversation” was “between the Court and the people and their
representatives,”182 not between different courts.
To the extent that Bickel considered the relationship between
the Court and other federal courts, he conceived of the Court as the
principal—“the hierarchical head” in the quotation above—and other
federal courts as its faithful agents. “Some of the methods and devices
I have discussed are obviously not open to use in the lower courts,” he
observed, adding that “[s]ome are, and as to them, the system of
precedent, by which the Supreme Court instructs the lower courts and
employs them as its agents, will serve.”183 Along similar lines, political
scientist Henry Abraham wrote that the Court “stands at the very
pinnacle of the judiciary: There is no higher court, and all others bow
before it—or, at least, are expected to do so.”184 Closer to the present,
Professor Katie Eyer writes that, “as others have observed, the lower
federal courts are, in our system, bounded by a constitutional culture
179. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295 (2005):
In the legal academy, thinking about the judicial system is distinctly top-down. There
is a hierarchy, and at the pinnacle sits the Supreme Court. The work of the Supreme
Court gets the lion’s share of attention, and it is simply taken for granted that lower
courts do, and should, follow the mandate of higher courts.
(footnote omitted).
180. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (1962).
181. Id. at 16, 198.
182. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970).
183. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 198.
184. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 186 (7th ed. 1998).
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that regards them primarily as the faithful agents of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional perspective.”185
Because such scholarship in law and political science models the
relationship between the Court and other federal courts hierarchically,
it understands the “apex” and “inferior” courts to perform different
functions and to engage in characteristically different forms of
reasoning. Some legal scholars who write in this vein, like Judge
Richard Posner, purport to be realistically assessing the differences
between the Supreme Court and other federal courts.186 In Posner’s
view, whereas the Court is a “political body,” a “lawless judicial
institution” in the sense that it possesses “an ocean of discretion,”187
other federal courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent and so are
better able to exhibit “a certain respect for the conventional materials
of decision.”188 Similarly, Professor Thomas Merrill writes that the
Court “frequently supplements consideration of precedent with other
types of authority, such as social policy, precedent from other legal
systems, and occasionally even original understanding.”189 By contrast,
Merrill views other federal courts as more restrained because they
“resolve constitutional cases almost exclusively in terms of applicable
Supreme Court precedent.”190
There is obvious value to viewing the Supreme Court and other
federal courts as interacting hierarchically. Both casual empiricism and
empirical studies document the general tendency of lower courts to
comply with Supreme Court precedent.191 There is also value to viewing
them as distinct institutions with different jobs to do. There are obvious
differences between the roles of the Court and other federal courts, just
as there are differences between the circuit courts and the district
courts.192 For example, circuit courts have a responsibility to correct
legal errors to a greater extent than does the Court, and the Court has
a greater responsibility to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of

185. Eyer, supra note 53, at 217 (citing Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism:
Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (2012)).
186. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005).
187. Id. at 34, 41.
188. Id. at 43.
189. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 286 (2005).
190. Id.
191. For a skeptical discussion of that literature, see Friedman, supra note 179, at 299–302.
192. For example, trial courts are the primary factfinders in the state and federal judicial
systems.
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important questions of federal law than do the circuit courts.193 In
addition, as noted above, Justices are not strictly bound by Supreme
Court precedent and so have more discretion than other federal
judges.194 Relatedly, and as noted at the end of Part I, other federal
courts may be more hesitant than the Court to act on their own in
response to broad shifts in cultural values, perhaps because in the
public imagination the Court is viewed more as a lawmaker and the
circuit courts are viewed more as law appliers.195 For that reason,
engaged people care substantially more about who sits on the Court
than who sits on any other court. If one models the federal judicial
system hierarchically—as a pyramid with one node at the top—there
are meaningful differences between the functions of that node and the
functions of each of the increasing number of nodes as one proceeds
downward.
And yet, just as there are limits to studying the Supreme Court
mostly in isolation,196 there are limits to the hierarchical model. One
lesson of recent gay rights litigation in federal courts around the
country (and desegregation and reapportionment litigation decades
earlier) is that the Supreme Court and other federal courts may at times
interact dialectically, not just hierarchically. Bickel missed that feature
of their relationship, even though it was apparent at the time, when he
wrote that “[t]hroughout, of course, the lower courts can act in
constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial decisionmakers only.”197 Bickel, it bears repeating, imagined only a
“conversation” between the Supreme Court and the American people,198
which caused him to overlook the “conversation” between the Court and
other federal courts. The latter conversation helps constitute the federal
courts as a system—a system in which lines of communication and

193. Compare, for example, the mandatory jurisdiction of the circuit courts with the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
194. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)); see also Merrill, supra note 189, at 285 (“The Supreme Court follows a weak
theory with regard to its own constitutional precedents, whereas the lower courts are regarded as
being absolutely bound by these precedents.”).
195. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 53, at 202, 217 (so arguing).
196. For example, if Bickel had focused more on the relationship between the Court and other
federal courts, he might have registered the problems that the Court can create for those lower
courts when it manipulates justiciability doctrines to avoid deciding the merits of a case: other
federal courts may not know whether to take the Court’s potential manipulations seriously as legal
doctrine. A possible example is Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), discussed supra
note 29. For an analysis of Hollingsworth as a “passive virtues” decision, see Siegel, supra note 23,
at 135–40.
197. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 198.
198. BICKEL, supra note 182, at 91.
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influence can run back and forth, not just down. Again, if one models
that system as consisting of both nodes and links between nodes, the
nodes look different—and their functions may in certain situations
appear more, rather than less, alike—when viewed in the light cast by
the links.199
Other scholarship in law and political science recognizes some of
the limits of the top-down understanding of hierarchical approaches.
Rather than focusing on the dialectic emphasized in this Article,
however, such scholarship attacks the hierarchical model’s assumption
of lower court compliance with Supreme Court precedent. That
scholarship takes more of a bottom-up approach by conceptualizing the
lower federal courts as potentially faithless agents who must therefore
be monitored by the Court to ensure compliance with its decisions.200
One group of political scientists reports that “[a] wealth of research in
the last two decades has examined how the Supreme Court (as
principals) can effectively oversee lower court judges (its agents).”201
Scholars writing in this area, called “cue theory,”202 have offered a
variety of solutions. They include ideologically strategic auditing by the
Court to manage information asymmetry,203 fire alarms by litigants in
the form of amicus filings or strategic appeals to the Court,204 signals

199. Cf. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 236 (1968) (“But the fact is that the
Supreme Court is not alone, that it shares with all common-law courts the status of existing in the
tension between the principled universe of ‘logic’ and the expedient requirements of ‘experience.’ ”).
Deutsch was responding to Bickel’s assertion that “[t]here are crucial differences—which, of
course, the opinions in Marbury v. Madison and Cohens v. Virginia seek to obscure—between the
role of the Supreme Court in constitutional cases and the function of courts of general jurisdiction.”
BICKEL, supra note 180, at 173.
200. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 179, at 296 (“Focusing on how compliance is obtained,
rather than presuming it, gives the positive literature much more of a bottom-up flavor in the
sense that action at the bottom rungs of the judicial ladder can set the agenda for what happens
above.”).
201. Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower
Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J. POL. 150, 150 (2013).
202. The seminal work is Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin & Daniel
Rosen, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111–
32 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963).
203. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a
Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (2000); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
649, 667 (2000).
204. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1110–11 (1988). But see Gregory A.
Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher Zorn, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court Revisited 9 (July 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2109497 [https://perma.cc/E47V-JF9L]) (“At the same time that the number of amicus
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from the Solicitor General when certain conditions are met,205 and
whistleblowing by judges further down the hierarchy in the form of
dissenting opinions,206 including opinions that read like petitions for a
writ of certiorari.207 All such proposals imagine the Supreme Court as
attempting to police other federal courts that might be acting
strategically or pursuing their own ideological agenda rather than
seeking to channel the Court’s priorities.208 Such work suggests that
lower courts can force the Court’s hand,209 thereby impacting the
content of constitutional law.210
The bottom-up work canvassed above is more realistic than topdown approaches because it asks how hierarchy is maintained given
ideological disagreements between judges on different courts. Like

filings on certiorari have grown—and perhaps owing to it—the influence of those briefs has
steadily declined.”).
205. See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth
Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 72, 72 (2005) (finding that the Court is more receptive to signals from the solicitor general
(“SG”) when either the Court and the SG are ideologically aligned or when the SG’s signal is
contrary to her ideological predisposition).
206. See, e.g., Deborah Beim, Alexander V. Hirsch & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Whistleblowing
and Compliance in the Judiciary Hierarchy, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 904, 904 (2013) (presenting a model
showing that whistleblowing is most informative—and therefore most effective in influencing
compliance in the judicial hierarchy—when it is rare). For legal scholarship on whistleblowing,
see, for example, Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998).
207. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially
concurring) (“The Supreme Court has chosen this erroneous path and only the Court can rectify
the error. In the meantime, I write separately to underscore this detour from constitutional first
principles.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, J., dissenting from
denial of reh’g en banc) (“I respectfully dissent from that decision [not to rehear the case en banc],
without expressing a view on the merits of the questions presented by this appeal, in the hope that
the Supreme Court will resolve the issues of great significance raised by this case.”).
208. A related literature seeks to understand the factors that determine whether lower courts
treat Supreme Court precedents favorably. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg,
Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 5, 10–11 (2016) (citing prominent works in the literature to which it contributes);
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Bruce A. Desmarais, Standing the Test of Time: The Breadth of Majority
Coalitions and the Fate of U.S. Supreme Court Precedents, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 445, 446–47 (2012)
(same). Rather than assuming hierarchy, this literature, too, perceives that lower federal courts
have some leeway and so influence the impact of Supreme Court opinions.
209. For examples, see Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d
1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (guaranteeing Supreme Court review by invalidating the “individual
mandate” in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); supra note 157 (citing circuit court
decisions in Heller and Lopez).
210. See, e.g., McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1995) (“Our theory suggests that the Supreme
Court will expand the range of lower court decisions that it finds acceptable when faced with
substantial noncompliance by the lower courts.”).
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Supreme Court Rule 10,211 such work does not simply assume the
existence of hierarchy or attribute hierarchy entirely to norm
internalization by lower court judges. Because such bottom-up
scholarship posits an adversarial relationship between the Court and
lower federal courts, however, it cannot account for the phenomenon of
reciprocal legitimation.
Closer to the idea of reciprocal legitimation is writing on
“percolation.” That literature emphasizes the advantages of first
allowing lower courts to decide novel legal questions for themselves, so
that the Supreme Court can obtain a full airing of the issues and a
diversity of opinions before it intervenes.212 The percolation literature
also takes a bottom-up approach, but like reciprocal legitimation, it
posits a non-adversarial relationship between the Court and the lower
federal courts. The more cooperative nature of the relationship helps
explain why the Justices themselves value percolation: as is wellknown, the Court generally prefers to grant certiorari to resolve circuit
splits,213 and “mature” splits are typically preferred to “shallow” ones.
Yet the percolation literature, too, cannot account for either the
frequency or the nature of reciprocal legitimation. Unlike percolation,
which is relatively common, reciprocal legitimation is most likely to
arise when the culture is deeply divided on a question of collective
constitutional identity; the Court takes sides in the conflict; and in
doing so it risks some portion of its public legitimacy. In such a
situation, the Court may determine that its institutional interests are
best served by moving slowly and deciding less than it is legally entitled
to decide, and so initially not coercing other federal courts with respect
to the broader question. Intended reciprocal legitimation is a technique
that the Court is most likely to use when, in confronting such a
situation, it anticipates that it is likely to succeed if it first attempts to

211. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (identifying as potentially worthy of review cases in which “a United
States court of appeals . . . has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power”); SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (identifying as potentially worthy of review cases in
which “a state court or a United States court of appeals . . . has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court”).
212. For defenses of percolation, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985), and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication By a ResourceConstrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1626
(1995). For discussion of the percolation literature, see Friedman, supra note 179, at 305–06.
Critics of percolation raise rule-of-law objections to not treating like cases alike. For a discussion,
see id. at 306.
213. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (identifying as potentially worthy of review cases in which “a United
States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States
court of appeals on the same important matter”).
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persuade other federal courts to decide an issue in the Court’s preferred
way.
Unlike percolation, moreover, reciprocal legitimation is a
process in which the Supreme Court is the initial mover and
encourager, whether intentionally or not. The Supreme Court speaks in
ways that potentially lend legitimacy to controversial decisions by other
federal courts that expand the scope of the Court’s decision, and then
those other courts speak in ways that potentially lend legitimacy to a
decision by the Court that validates the expansion. As exemplified by
Brown, Baker, Windsor, and their aftermaths, reciprocal legitimation
unfolds in iterative, dialectical fashion. Rather than maintaining a topdown relationship reflective of hierarchy or a bottom-up relationship
indicative of conflict or percolation, the Supreme Court and other
federal courts move back and forth. In proceeding side by side,
moreover, they are not engaged in different enterprises; on the
contrary, the enterprise itself consists of their interaction and provision
of mutual support—their provision of reciprocal legitimation.214
The conversation between the Court and other federal courts,
which this Article has examined, is not independent of the conversation
between the Court and the public, which Bickel emphasized. It is
precisely when the public is deeply divided, and so maintaining the
Court’s public legitimacy is a concern, that the Court will be most likely
to leverage its interaction with other federal courts in an attempt to
legitimate a particular result in the “court” of public opinion. To repeat
a point from the previous Section, judicial repudiations of state
prohibitions on same-sex marriage in the wake of Windsor became
normalized in light of the torrent of (widely reported) federal court
invalidations, as the Court reminded readers in its opinion in
Obergefell.
That normalization process may partially respond to skeptical
questions about how much of a legitimation effect is actually produced
by reciprocal legitimation. It is important to underscore, however, that
this Article has not sought to establish that members of the public and
214. The tepid reactions of other federal courts to Heller, see supra Section II.B.3, and to Lopez,
see supra notes 143, 156–157, and accompanying text, raise the question whether one can
generalize about when those courts will expand the scope of a decision by the Court. Notably, the
circuit courts in both Heller and Lopez were the first to require significant legal change, and so
they may have forced the Court’s hand. Other potentially relevant considerations include the pace
and direction of public opinion; the stances of the political branches; the degree of ideological
alignment between the Court and other federal courts; whether and how state courts are ruling;
and whether a litigation campaign has organized around the issue. Interesting questions are
lurking here, all of which come into view only upon recognizing that legal change in the federal
judiciary is neither entirely top-down nor bottom-up, but also side-by-side.
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politicians care whether other courts provide support for Supreme
Court decisions, and vice versa. It probably counts for something that
judges are moved to engage in reciprocal legitimation during stressful
times, but reciprocal legitimation warrants investigation even if the
Court is mistaken in thinking that the dialectic will enhance its public
legitimacy—just as the Brown Court’s attempts to moderate may have
proven counterproductive.
C. Extensions of the Model
The model offered in this Article is amenable to several
extensions. One of them, which is implicit in the reapportionment
example developed in Part II.B, is to include state courts. State courts
may at times perform the same function vis-à-vis the U.S. Supreme
Court as do federal courts. As noted in the Introduction and Part I, the
majority opinion in Obergefell contains an Appendix B listing state
legislation and judicial decisions legalizing same-sex marriage.215 The
Court invoked that appendix once in its opinion, noting the connection
between the state interventions it referenced in the appendix and the
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the
Goodridge case.216 The Court did not mention the likely connection
between the state statutes and judicial decisions listed in the appendix
and the Court’s own intervention in Lawrence v. Texas,217 which
occurred the same year as Goodridge. So Obergefell itself appears to be
an instance in which reciprocal legitimation involved state courts in
addition to federal courts. The primary difference, as noted at the end
of the Introduction, is when one dates the beginning of the
interaction.218
A second extension would focus on interactions among courts
entirely within a state judicial system. Today, state courts seem more
215. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015). In addition, the final section of
Appendix A listed the decisions of state high courts that addressed same-sex marriage. See id. at
2610.
216. Id. at 2597 (“In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the State’s
Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. . . . After that ruling, some
additional States granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, either through judicial or
legislative processes. These decisions and statutes are cited in Appendix B, infra.” (citing
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003))).
217. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see supra note 63 (noting that the Lawrence Court deemed the
expression of moral opposition to homosexuality an illegitimate state interest).
218. There is a robust literature on state constitutionalism and its relationship to
constitutional norm generation, including at the federal level. For the seminal contribution, see
Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147
(1993).
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likely to be threatened with defiance by state officials than are federal
courts. An example is the recent separation of powers dispute in Kansas
over public school funding. “As advocates of increased school funding
brought their request to the Kansas Supreme Court,” the New York
Times reported in 2013, “the staunchly conservative Legislature vowed
to defy any court orders that it felt trampled on its sovereignty.”219 The
court and the legislature subsequently proceeded to lock horns, with the
court repeatedly instructing the legislature “to finance public schools
equitably, especially poorer districts with less property wealth,”220 or
face a shutdown of public schools in the state.221 For their part, “many
lawmakers who think the court was overreaching its authority were
calling for the Legislature to defy the court.”222 Governor Sam
Brownback—under pressure for cuts to state programs that many
attribute to the tax cuts he championed in 2012 and 2013—called the
legislature into special session to avoid a showdown with the court that
could close the schools.223 The drama continued until the legislature
passed a new funding bill during the special session, the governor
signed it, and the state supreme court quickly issued a decision before
the deadline accepting the new funding plan and avoiding a shutdown
of the schools.224 Meanwhile, the Republican Party campaigned—
ultimately unsuccessfully225—to oust four members of the court in the
upcoming retention election.226
Because state judges are more likely than federal judges to be
threatened with disobedience (and to have to stand for re-election),
state judges may more frequently have reason to take steps to protect
their public legitimacy. If that is right, then the phenomenon of
reciprocal legitimation may be more likely to arise in state judicial
219. John Eligon, Kansas Legislature Threatens Showdown with Court over School Financing,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/kansas-legislature-threatensshowdown-with-court-over-school-financing.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7MJ6-DLZ8].
220. Julie Bosman, Kansas Parents Worry Schools Are Slipping Amid Budget Battles, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/us/kansas-parents-worry-schools-areslipping-amid-budget-battles.html [https://perma.cc/X62Q-FBHM].
221. Id.
222. Joe Robertson et al., Gov. Sam Brownback Calls Kansas Lawmakers into Special Session
on Schools, KAN. CITY STAR (June 7, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/ politicsgovernment/article82238222.html [https://perma.cc/VX22-2LMK].
223. Bosman, supra note 220; Robertson et al., supra note 222.
224. See Kansas Supreme Court Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN POLITICS, https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_Supreme_Court_elections,_2016 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3FSF-FEX2].
225. See id.
226. See Sam Zeff, Get Ready for a Raucous Kansas Supreme Court Retention Race, KCUR.ORG
(May
24,
2016),
http://kcur.org/post/get-ready-raucous-kansas-supreme-court-retentionrace#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/S4H6-8E9P].
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systems than in the federal system. Whether that hypothesis is
correct—whether state high courts and other state courts rely upon one
another for mutual support in politically stressful times—warrants
scholarly investigation. If that hypothesis is incorrect, then it is worth
examining whether and why state courts seek to safeguard their public
legitimacy in other ways,227 including by avoiding the sort of
controversy that might tempt judges to pursue reciprocal legitimation
in the first place.
A third extension would move beyond judges and examine the
extent to which the Court may pursue reciprocal legitimation with
powerful non-judicial actors, such as presidents, Congresses, agencies,
state governments, interest groups, repeat litigants, and social
movements. As Professor Keith Whittington and others have shown,
political leaders, especially presidents, have generally had institutional
reasons to support the Court’s assertions of interpretive authority. 228
And the Court has at times invoked congressional deliberations and
federal statutes or regulations as partial authority for its own
decisions.229 There seems no inherent reason why reciprocal
legitimation would be limited to interactions among judges, given that
political actors may also perceive the need to look outside themselves in
order to legitimate their publicly controversial decisions.
Finally, the relationship between reciprocal legitimation and
democratic experimentation warrants examination. It is possible that
reciprocal legitimation can sometimes blend into societal
experimentation and learning. For example, suppose that instead of
deciding Obergefell two years after Windsor, the Supreme Court had
decided it five years later. In the interim, a large number of same-sex
marriages would have taken place, and Americans who were either
opposed to or uncertain about same-sex marriage would have seen that
the sky did not fall. They may have already seen that the sky did not

227. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that state law’s limitation of
marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the state constitution, but permitting the legislature to
choose between allowing same-sex couples to marry and allowing them to form civil unions with
every benefit of marriage).
228. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 165.
229. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) (“Thus, Congress itself has
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a
coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under
consideration.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“The principle now
contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognised by many
successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar
delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.”).
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fall in the years before Obergefell, but with more time additional
evidence would have accumulated.230
IV. RECIPROCAL LEGITIMATION AND JUDICIAL CANDOR
Because reciprocal legitimation has not previously been
identified, the primary purposes of this Article are descriptive and
analytical, not normative. So far, accordingly, the Article has sought to
name and understand reciprocal legitimation, to document several
instances of the phenomenon or its absence, to connect it to more
familiar judicial behaviors, and to explore its implications for
scholarship in constitutional law, federal courts, and judicial politics.
Before evaluating a judicial practice, it seems more important first to
understand the practice, including from the perspective of the judges
who engage in it.
Yet reciprocal legitimation—especially, but not only, its
intentional variant—does potentially raise normative concerns. That is
because the Justices who participate in the process tend to compromise
judicial candor in the service of protecting the Court’s public legitimacy.
This Part defends a rebuttable presumption in favor of judicial candor,
identifies stronger and weaker justifications for judicial opinions that
lack full candor, and applies its analysis to Windsor and Obergefell.
A. A Definition and Defense of a Presumption Favoring Candor
In an influential essay defending a strong presumption in favor
of judicial candor, Professor David Shapiro explained that a statement
lacks candor when the person making it believes it to be false, and the
person makes the statement either with the intent to mislead a target
audience, or with indifference to whether the statement will deceive
that audience.231 Shapiro’s conceptualization extends to omissions. An
omission lacks candor when the failure to disclose is designed to
mislead the target audience in some material way about what has been
said, or when the speaker is indifferent to the fact that the omission will
render what she has said materially deceptive.232 One could puzzle over
the requisite mens rea (for example, intent, knowledge, or recklessness)

230. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”).
231. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 732.
232. Id. at 732–33.
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of a speaker for her statement or omission to qualify as lacking candor.
But what matters most for present purposes is that the presence or
absence of candor depends upon the mental state of the speaker.233
Both intended and unintended reciprocal legitimation raise
potential concerns about an absence of candor, because both may
involve the same lack of forthrightness at the end of the process about
the Court’s own causal influence earlier in the process. For example, it
seems less than entirely candid for the Court in Obergefell to have
repeatedly characterized its own intervention in favor of marriage
equality only as an effect of developments in the lower federal courts
and elsewhere, and not also as a cause of those developments.
Although both variants of reciprocal legitimation potentially
raise normative concerns, the potential concerns with intended
reciprocal legitimation are greater. That is because it implicates
additional questions about a lack of full candor at the start of the
process. For example, it was potentially misleading for the Court in
Windsor to have spoken out of both sides of its mouth, including by
introducing a novel “federalism” analysis that seemed more
instrumentally useful in temporarily limiting the scope of the holding
than it was logically necessary, persuasive on its own terms, or likely to
decide any future cases.234 It seems likely that some opponents of samesex marriage who invoked the federalism reasoning in Windsor for their
own purposes felt manipulated or misled upon learning the holding in
Obergefell.235
Perhaps the Court was not misleading sophisticated consumers
of its opinions, who might be thought to know better. Yet as noted in
233. See id. at 732 (“[T]he declarant’s state of mind is crucial.”).
234. One might object that the federalism analysis in Windsor illuminated the equal protection
question by showing that the federal law’s uniqueness impugned Congress’s motives in enacting
it. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States
v. Windsor, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV 117, 119 (concluding that federalism “played a critical
role” in the Court’s opinion). Straightforward equal protection reasoning would have sufficed,
however, and defining marriage for all federal purposes as including same-sex marriages would
be just as unusual as excluding them but would not be suspicious. Moreover, it is difficult to
identify another actual or hypothetical federal law that would be unconstitutional on similar
federalism grounds. For a discussion, see generally Siegel, supra note 23. As discussed infra
Section IV.B, however, the Court was being candid if it believed what it wrote about the federalism
problems with the statute and was not using federalism reasoning for other purposes.
235. See, e.g., Eric Restuccia & Aaron Lindstrom, Federalism and the Authority of the States
to Define Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/
federalism-and-the-authority-of-the-states-to-define-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/G9GA-E7ZM]:
[T]he principles in Windsor of respect for state sovereignty and the authority of the
people of the states to define marriage support the conclusion that the Court will affirm
the constitutionality of those states that have reaffirmed the historic understanding of
marriage—the union of one man and one woman.
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Part I, a number of federal judges, including some eminent ones, read
Windsor as a federalism opinion, even after Justice Scalia repeatedly
called out the Court in Windsor for the federalism language in the
majority opinion.236 Moreover, no dissenter in Obergefell criticized the
Court for the conduct identified in this Article, even as each dissenter
otherwise seemed eager to undermine the Court’s legitimacy.237
Whatever its impact on close observers of its work, the Court
may be misleading less sophisticated readers of its opinions—or
Americans who hear about the Court’s decisions from less sophisticated
readers in the news media. They may not realize the extent of the
Court’s own role in creating, perhaps intentionally, a bandwagon effect
in the federal courts—not in the states—throughout the nation. Nor
may they realize that they are not being told the whole truth when the
Court in Obergefell invokes the results of a process in support of its
decision with no recognition that it had played a part in producing the
process.238 That group may include first-year law students, whose
edited casebook versions of Obergefell likely omit Appendix A and at
least some of the Court’s several references to it.
Transparency, and therefore candor, is a core value of the rule
of law, and frequently detected absences of candor can strain the subtle
relationships of trust that sustain the rule of law.239 Expressively,
moreover, an absence of candor suggests that a particular audience is
not entitled to the truth or cannot be trusted with the truth, and so is
236. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“My
guess is that the majority . . . needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today’s
prohibition of laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government (leaving
the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term).” (footnote omitted)); id. at 2710:
[T]hat Court which finds it so horrific that Congress irrationally and hatefully robbed
same-sex couples of the “personhood and dignity” which state legislatures conferred
upon them, will of a certitude be similarly appalled by state legislatures’ irrational and
hateful failure to acknowledge that “personhood and dignity” in the first place.
(citation to majority opinion omitted); id. (“The majority’s limiting assurance will be meaningless
in the face of language like that, as the majority well knows. That is why the language is there.”).
237. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I
write separately to call attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy.”); id. at 2630 n.22:
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that
began: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express
their identity,” I would hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United States
has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story
to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.
238. See Jack M. Balkin, The Supreme Court Simulates a State Bandwagon Effect in Favor of
Same-Sex Marriage, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 7, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/10/thesupreme-court-simulates-state.html [https://perma.cc/N4JU-NFDH].
239. For a discussion of rule-of-law values and the political foundations of the rule of law, see
Siegel, supra note 87, at 965–69.
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undeserving of equal respect.240 It demeans the dignity of people to
mislead them, at least without substantial justification for doing so. 241
To fully grasp this point, one need only recall instances in which one
has received important communications that in material ways lacked
candor, only to later learn the full truth of the matter.
In addition, obligations of reason giving are typically (although
not invariably) imposed on judges. They are imposed in important part
to discipline the exercise of judicial power—to subject judicial decisions
to critical scrutiny. Absent an obligation of candor, however, that
method of discipline is greatly diminished. As Professor David Shapiro
observes, “[J]udges who regard themselves as free to distort or misstate
the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and
condemnation that honest disclosure of their motivation may entail.”242
All that said, the complexity of the normative question eludes a
simple admonition that the Court should be forthright in every respect
in every case. One need not agree with Professor Martin Shapiro that
“[c]ourts and judges always lie,” or that “[l]ying is the nature of the
judicial activity,”243 to register that judicial opinion writing (and
joining) is a genre of communication engaged in by individuals who are
performing a particular institutional role with its own sometimes subtle
rules and expectations. For example, the Court does not generally
regard itself as permitted to acknowledge that it makes law even
though many observers understand that it has little choice but to make
law in significant respects.244 Accordingly, it can be difficult to
determine what kinds of forthrightness about which issues are required
in a judicial opinion.
In addition, it has long been recognized that the Brown Court’s
narrow focus on education, as opposed to the relationship between
segregation and equality more generally, was not a model of candor, nor
240. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 736–37 (“[L]ack of candor often carries with it the
implication that the listener is less capable of dealing with the truth, and thus less worthy of
respect, than the speaker.”).
241. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555,
598 (2010):
[I]nstrumental considerations aside, there are dignitary harms associated with
misleading the public about the nature and function of judicial review. It is wrong to
deceive people—and thereby to diminish their apprehension of the governmental
institutions under which they live—in the absence of very good reason for doing so.
242. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 737.
243. Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994). It is not
obvious how to reconcile such statements with Shapiro’s earlier criticisms of Brown and Baker for
lacking candor. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
244. For discussions, see generally, for example, Post & Siegel, supra note 83; Neil S. Siegel,
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007).
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were the subsequent unreasoned per curiams.245 That concern,
however, may have been the least of the Court’s problems. Brown
exemplifies the truth that complete candor is not always the best policy
in law or life.246 A scholar who saw this before others is Professor Jan
Deutsch, who passed away while this Article was being written.
Deutsch intervened in the late 1960s in response to the criticisms of the
Court’s segregation and reapportionment decisions by both Professor
Herbert Wechsler (wielding his “neutral principles”) and Professor
Martin Shapiro (wielding his “political jurisprudence”).247 Deutsch
brilliantly observed that “the Court, as an institution, has certain
institutional needs—for example, the needs to ensure survival and
operate efficiently,” and “those needs are necessarily reflected in the
form and content of its work.”248 Those needs, he added, preclude fully
candid judicial opinions.249
The Court sometimes finds itself operating in a fallen world—
that is, a world in which important constitutional rights have yet to be
protected due to public and professional opposition.250 In such a world,
the Court may have its work cut out for itself as it seeks to secure the
public legitimacy of divisive decisions that vindicate basic
constitutional values. If, as Professor Akhil Amar has suggested, “the
judicial province and duty is not merely to say what the law is, but also
to make the law real,”251 then Brown’s professed narrowness is
potentially supported by sufficient justification. Demanding full candor
is sometimes asking too much of government officials, including
Justices, who may be trying in good faith to execute their
responsibilities in circumstances in which others are undermining their
ability to do so for reasons that are themselves difficult to defend.
In less extreme circumstances, a Court whose view of the law
warrants a relatively maximalist response to a legal question may
245. See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing the conduct of the Brown Court).
246. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 199, at 240 (“No marriage is perfect, and precious few are
great, but the fact that any marriage would disintegrate under the stress of an insistent demand
for complete candor is nevertheless sufficient to convince us that intellectual honesty is inadequate
as the sole criterion for selection of a marital partner.”).
247. See supra notes 94, 123, and accompanying text (citing the work of Wechsler and
Shapiro).
248. Deutsch, supra note 199, at 213.
249. See id. at 249 (“Shapiro’s condemnation of the reapportionment and segregation
decisions, like the insistence on candor that results in the coalescence of his assessments of the
Court’s work with those of [Wechsler and Hand], thus arises from his disregard of the institutional
needs of the Court.”).
250. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD (2011).
251. AMAR, supra note 107, at 215.
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nonetheless write a relatively minimalist opinion for a variety of
potentially worthwhile reasons that it is not prepared to announce
publicly, because doing so would be self-undermining or would appear
political. For example the Court may be seeking to maintain collegiality
within the Court, which may be essential to its efficient functioning well
beyond the case under review.252 Or the Court may be trying to
maintain some measure of solidarity in American society, which may
be threatened to a greater extent by more decisive judicial
interventions.253 Or the Court may be trying to put stakeholders on
notice that a substantial change in the law is coming, thereby reducing
reliance interests in a gradual way. Such rationales for relative
minimalism, even if they are not publicly articulated, seem
distinguishable from situations in which the Court is simply trying to
insulate itself from professional criticism by presenting itself as more
restrained than it is or intends to be.
It is challenging to reconcile all of the competing considerations
canvassed above. Without delving deeper into a difficult topic, however,
it seems reasonable to conclude—and in any event the following
analysis will assume—that the Court is generally obliged to be candid
regarding the reasons for its interventions and decisions, but that this
obligation is defeasible in the face of adequate justification. At one end
of the spectrum of justifications, Brown-like reasons—that is, making
the law real for people on the ground, and sustaining the Court’s public
legitimacy in the face of real threats of defiance or recriminations—
seem like adequate justifications for judicial opinions that are not fully
candid. At the other end of the spectrum, an attempt by the Court to
insulate itself from accountability for its decisions—from professional
and public criticism—is inadequate justification for abandoning judicial
candor. In between those extremes, concerns sounding in collegiality,
solidarity, or reliance potentially justify opinions that lack full candor,
but whether such concerns can carry the day depends on the
circumstances—on the extent to which such concerns are pressing and
the extent of the sacrifice of candor.

252. See supra Section II.B.2 (noting the Baker majority’s loyalty to Justice Stewart even when
it no longer needed his vote); cf., e.g., Deutsch, supra note 199, at 213 (emphasizing the Court’s
need to operate efficiently).
253. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 50 (1999) (explaining that narrow, shallow Supreme Court opinions “are efforts to achieve
both social stability and a degree of reciprocity, together with mutual respect, under conditions
that threaten to endanger these important values”).
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B. Windsor and Obergefell
With that admittedly rough conceptualization of the problem in
mind, this Part turns back to Windsor and Obergefell. Any attempt to
evaluate the Court’s candor in those cases must confront a serious
problem, which the previous Section anticipated. Candor turns on
subjective intent, and one cannot be certain what the Court was
intending. The Justices in the majority have not told us, and no
“smoking gun” evidence is available to date.
If the Court was not trying to mislead anyone with its federalism
analysis in Windsor and with its invocations of other federal court
decisions in Obergefell, then the opinions suffered from no lack of
candor.254 But even if the Court was being somewhat disingenuous in
those opinions for the reasons articulated above, it does not appear that
it was being entirely disingenuous. Windsor can be understood as a
quasi-Bickelian intervention: the Court made a move in what appears
to have been an interaction with other federal courts and then waited
to see whether and how those courts would take it up on its offer.255 The
Court’s intervention appeared genuinely Bickelian, not simply
disingenuous, for at least two reasons.
First, other federal courts were not required as a matter of
vertical stare decisis to respond as the Court wanted them to respond.
As noted in Part I, the Court gave more socially conservative or cautious
courts the resources with which to reject the Court’s offer. As also
documented in Part I, moreover, some of those courts (and individual
judges on other courts) did reject the offer.256 And the Court took the
254. Perhaps Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion in Windsor, is differently
situated from the other members of the majority. The question for them is whether collegiality
concerns justified their signing onto federalism reasoning they found unpersuasive (assuming they
did). According to David Shapiro, “[T]he sticking point can and should be an unwillingness to make
or join in a statement that does not represent the judge’s views and that will mislead the opinion’s
readers as to what those views are.” Shapiro, supra note 16, at 743. That standard, however, may
ask too much of a nine-judge court that issues more than seventy opinions a year. It also seems
unlikely that most readers will be misled given the understanding that Justices often join opinions
containing reasoning to which they do not subscribe.
255. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 182, at 91 (“Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court
are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives.”).
Windsor is best thought of as a continuation of a preexisting conversation that began with Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See supra notes 20–22
and accompanying text; supra Section III.C. Moreover, as explored in Section III.B, the
conversation was not just between the Court and the public, but also between the Court and other
federal courts.
256. As Richard Re has observed, Justice Scalia encouraged federal and state courts to
distinguish Windsor. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1861, 1909 (2014) (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
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risk (even if a relatively modest one) that it would have to decide
whether to rule in favor of marriage equality in the teeth of numerous
federal court decisions reading Windsor as assigning to the states the
authority to decide the issue of same-sex marriage. The genuine ability
of other courts not to move in the direction to which the Court was
pointing lends some legitimacy to the Court’s reliance on the rulings of
those courts that did follow along. To borrow concepts from other areas
of law, the consent given by the circuit courts seemed voluntary and
informed; they were not acting under duress.
On the other hand, Professors David Klein and Neal Devins offer
empirical evidence that federal and state courts almost always follow a
statement in an opinion of a higher court even though it is dictum and
so outside the boundaries of formal precedent.257 Matters may look
different from the account offered immediately above if federal courts
in same-sex marriage cases conceived of their role as predicting what
the Supreme Court would do or want258 or were simply concerned about
being reversed when future intervention by the Court was virtually
assured.259 Matters may look different because of the relatively strong
signal that the Court sent in Windsor.
Even so, there remains a difference between a nudge from the
Court, which preserves circuit court decisionmaking autonomy, and a
shove from the Court, which does not. As noted in Part I.B, the Court
in Windsor offered a nudge. It also seems likely that circuit judges care
less about 7-2, 6-3, or 5-4 reversals, which are more likely to be
interpreted as reflecting legitimate disagreement, than about 8-1 or 9-0
reversals, which are more likely to sting and cause embarrassment. 260
It was obvious after Windsor that there were not more than five votes
257. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2036–42 (2013).
258. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994) (advocating a prediction-based
jurisprudence for use by judges). But see Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 651, 715 (1995) (arguing that, as a general matter, a prediction-based approach to judging
undermines the rule of law).
259. Some commentators argue that judges are motivated by reversal avoidance. See, e.g.,
Caminker, supra note 258, at 77 (“Much anecdotal evidence suggests that lower court judges
dislike being reversed on appeal.”). Others disagree, particularly regarding federal circuit judges,
in part because of the general unlikelihood of Supreme Court review. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 118–19 (1995) (“[A]version to reversal . . . is . . . fairly unimportant in the case
of court of appeals judges because reversals . . . have become rare and most reflect differences in
judicial philosophy or legal policy rather than mistake or incompetence by the appellate judges.”);
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1259, 1273 (2005).
260. Thanks to Dean David Levi for sharing this insight. Judge Richard Posner makes a
similar point in the works cited supra note 259.
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on the Supreme Court for invalidating any state prohibition on samesex marriage. Judges are also less likely to care about reversal when
they care deeply about the issue. For many judges, the constitutional
status of same-sex marriage is probably such an issue.
Second, the Court did not appear to be engaged in a complete
charade, even if its federalism analysis in Windsor left something to be
desired from the internal point of view.261 Rather, the Court seemed
interested in the ideas that had bubbled up from the courts of appeals.
For example, commentators have debated why Justice Kennedy
primarily wrote a substantive due process opinion (that is, one based
upon the right to marry)262 and not one or another classification-based
equal protection opinion (that is, one finding unjustified discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or sex). In search of answers,
commentators have emphasized such explanations as Justice
Kennedy’s libertarianism, his desire to avoid deciding certain
discrimination claims, and the virulence of conservative reactions to the
Court’s charges of animus in Windsor.263 Commentators have not,
however, considered what the Court may have learned from other
federal courts.
There was a basic difference between the majority opinions that
four circuit courts issued in favor of marriage equality. The opinions of
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, which rested on the right to marry, were
more respectful of opponents of same-sex marriage, and they were less
incendiary and broad than the opinions of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, which found unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.264 Even though the Court in Windsor mostly wrote
261. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (identifying problems with the Court’s
federalism reasoning in Windsor).
262. There is equality reasoning and an equal protection holding at the end of the majority
opinion, but even there the Court emphasizes discrimination in providing access to a fundamental
right, not classification-based equal protection. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604
(2015).
263. For various hypotheses, see, for example, PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 2015 SUPPLEMENT 133 (6th ed. 2015).
264. Compare Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Lawrence and Windsor
indicate that the choices that individuals make in the context of same-sex relationships enjoy the
same constitutional protection as the choices accompanying opposite-sex relationships.”), and
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096–97 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concurring) (“I write here . . .
to focus on one significant thing that the district court wisely did not do in rendering its substantive
ruling on the same-sex marriage ban. Specifically, the district court declined to rely upon animus
doctrine in striking down SQ 711.”), with Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The
challenged laws discriminate against a minority defined by an immutable characteristic, and the
only rationale that the states put forth with any conviction—that same-sex couples and their
children don’t need marriage because same-sex couples can’t produce children, intended or
unintended—is so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously.”), and Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456, 473 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Windsor makes clear that the defendants’ explicit desire to express a
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an equality-based, animus opinion,265 the Court in Obergefell mostly
shifted from equality to liberty and followed the approach adopted by
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Emphasizing that there is an identity
between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples regarding every
reason why the right to marry is protected today, the Court avoided
holding or implying that proponents of traditional marriage in state
after state had an invidious purpose or that sexual orientation
discrimination triggers heightened scrutiny in every context.266
Accordingly, if the federal courts were not moving entirely
independently of the Supreme Court, neither were they responding
entirely dependently. Because other federal courts were allowed to
weigh in—and because the Court seemed to care about how they
weighed in—before the Court decided the issue for itself, the Court’s
approach seems relatively conversational and participatory. Even as
the Court was nudging, it was also learning and adapting. Indeed, it is
not clear that the Court had decided in Windsor to invalidate all state
prohibitions on same-sex marriage. For example, if most other federal
courts had reacted differently to Windsor, or if the backlash to
invalidations had been substantially greater, the Court may have been
open to means of postponement. (That does not mean, however, that the
Court was using other federal courts merely as bellwethers for public
opinion, not as potential sources of support. If the Court had been using
those courts only as bellwethers, it probably would not have spent so
much time talking about them in Obergefell.)
To be sure, a more cynical interpretation of Windsor and
Obergefell is possible. On that view, the Court’s conduct in both cases
was a manipulative ruse, similar to the protestations in Bush v. Gore267

preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples is a categorically inadequate justification
for discrimination. Expressing such a preference is precisely what they may not do.”).
265. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in
Windsor).
266. At this point, whether the right to marry articulated in Obergefell includes three-person
or incestuous marriages is mostly the stuff of law school hypotheticals, unlike whether states may
discriminate against gay people in employment, housing, education, adoption, and family
formation. Practically, therefore, the Court’s liberty holding is narrower than an equality holding
likely would have been.
267. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (“When contending parties
invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the
federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”), with id. at 126–
27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Recognizing these principles, the majority nonetheless orders the
termination of the contest proceeding before all such votes have been tabulated. Under their own
reasoning, the appropriate course of action would be to remand to allow more specific procedures
for implementing the legislature’s uniform general standard to be established.”).
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and Citizens United v. FEC268 that the Court simply had to end the
controversy—there was no choice—when the Court itself was arguably
responsible for creating the perceived conditions of compulsion. It
seems improbable, however, that the Court would have ruled in favor
of marriage equality when it did, and on the grounds that it did,
regardless of how other federal courts responded to Windsor. Although
the Court may not have been entirely candid in Windsor and Obergefell,
it also seems overstated to conclude that other federal courts were only
its props, and not also its partners, along the path to Obergefell.
Not only is it unlikely that the Court was simply being
disingenuous in Windsor and Obergefell, but it also seems defensible to
conclude that the Court had reason to fear at least some acts of defiance
up and down the hierarchies of certain state governments and, more
importantly, to fear recriminations directed at members of the LGBT
community. Exemplifying concerns about compliance were the actions
of Chief Justice Roy Moore in Alabama269 and County Clerk Kim Davis
in Kentucky.270 Exemplifying concerns about recriminations are the
actions by certain states to prohibit measures protecting LGBT persons
from discrimination and to require transgender individuals to use
public bathrooms corresponding to their biological sex, not their gender
identity.271 Windsor was clearly not Brown in this regard, but neither
268. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“[T]he lack of a valid basis for
an alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech suppression
upheld in Austin.”), with id. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Essentially, five Justices were
unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves
an opportunity to change the law.”).
269. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, Top Alabama Judge Orders Halt to Same-Sex Marriage Licenses,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/top-alabama-judge-orders-haltto-same-sex-marriage-licenses.html?ref=topics [https://perma.cc/L7W9-W9BT] (“The chief justice
of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy S. Moore, on Wednesday effectively ordered probate judges in
the state not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, a move that could cloud the carrying
out of the United States Supreme Court decision that legalized same-sex unions.”); see also V.L. v.
E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2016) (per curiam) (holding unanimously that the Alabama Supreme
Court erred in refusing to grant full faith and credit to a judgment by a Georgia court making a
woman the legal parent of the children she had raised with her same-sex partner since birth,
because the judgment appears on its face to have been issued by a court with jurisdiction and there
is no established Georgia law to the contrary).
270. See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kim Davis, Released from Kentucky Jail,
Won’t Say if She Will Keep Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/09/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/7J8F-MEPJ]:
After five nights in jail for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Kim
Davis, a Kentucky county clerk, walked free Tuesday to a roar of cheers from thousands
of supporters, but she and her lawyer would not say whether she would continue to defy
court orders and try to block the licenses.
271. See, e.g., Dave Philipps, North Carolina Bans Local Anti-Discrimination Policies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-bathroomuse-by-birth-gender.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4E4F-BW9W]:
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does it seem appropriate to conclude that the Court in Windsor and
Obergefell may have compromised the obligation of judicial candor
merely in order to insulate itself from public criticism.
CONCLUSION
From the perspective of the relationship between the Supreme
Court and other federal courts, what may be most interesting about
United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges is what the casebooks
have taken out of the majority opinion in Obergefell. They have removed
its appendix, along with the opinion’s several references to it. In all
likelihood, the Court’s own conduct in Windsor was also a cause, and
not just an effect, of the federal court decisions referenced in Appendix
A. The Court’s conduct in Windsor may also have been an intended
cause.
The interaction between the Court and other federal courts
beginning in Windsor and ending in Obergefell is reminiscent of the
judicial conduct in racial segregation and reapportionment cases
decades earlier. The judicial interaction in recent marriage equality
cases exemplifies the potential power of judges to help produce
constitutional change. It also illuminates a nonobvious aspect of the
relationship between the Court and other courts in the system that they
collectively constitute.
For those who seek to understand how the American
constitutional system operates, reciprocal legitimation—different
courts invoking one another as authority in iterative fashion—warrants
examination even without an assertion or proof of initial subjective
intent. But it is worth considering whether instances of reciprocal
legitimation were initially intended, as perilous as that inquiry can be,
because an affirmative answer raises the question of why the Court
decided to proceed in that fashion. An affirmative answer may also
affect a normative evaluation of the Court’s conduct—specifically, the
extent to which judicial candor may permissibly be sacrificed in order
to vindicate other values. Indeed, intended reciprocal legitimation may
be the most interesting and controversial variant of the phenomenon

The state bill, put together so quickly that many lawmakers had not seen it before it
was introduced Wednesday morning, specifically bars people in North Carolina from
using bathrooms that do not match their birth gender, and goes further to prohibit
municipalities from creating their own antidiscrimination policies. Instead, it creates a
statewide antidiscrimination policy—one that does not mention gay and transgender
people.
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because it is indicative of a Court that can and does help shape the very
gestalt or public opinion to which it is often thought to respond.
The Court “labors under the obligation to succeed” not only in
moving the American public,272 but also in nudging federal judges.
There is always a risk that the Court will fail. But if the Court does
succeed, it will have earned the opportunity to invoke other federal
court rulings as authority for its own decisive decision in virtue of the
fact that it had previously permitted those courts to decide for
themselves.273
CODA:
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S POTENTIAL THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
This Article is making its way through the publication process
during a time in which the President of the United States, Donald J.
Trump, is disparaging the federal courts and particular federal judges
in ways that are unprecedented in modern times.274 The President has
given specific indications that, in the event of a terrorist attack, he will
blame the federal courts as well as the news media, which he
implausibly alleges is under-reporting such attacks.275 For example, the
272. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 239 (“The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of
it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and—the short of it is—it labors under the
obligation to succeed.”).
273. Reciprocal legitimation may help explain why judicial decisions invalidating bans on
same-sex marriage did not trigger the degree of backlash that theorists of the phenomenon had
earlier predicted. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH.
L. REV. 431, 459–72 (2005). Klarman later qualified his claims. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
(2013). So did William Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics: How
Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV.
275, 295–96 (2013).
274. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal
Battles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trumpmike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [https://perma.cc/SV5X-KQNL] (quoting the opinion of Jack
Goldsmith, head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel under President George W.
Bush, that “Trump’s serial attacks on judges and the judiciary take us into new territory”); Julie
Hirschfeld Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary ‘Demoralizing,’
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald -trumpimmigration-ban.html [https://perma.cc/6JQF-7TVT] (quoting the opinion of former George W.
Bush judicial appointee Michael McConnell that “Mr. Trump is shredding longstanding norms of
etiquette and interbranch comity”).
275. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Is News of Terror Attacks Underplayed? Experts Say No, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/terrorist-attack-media-coveragetrump.html [https://perma.cc/5GT8-TW4T] (“ ‘Pre-emptive blame,’ said [Martha] Crenshaw, the
Stanford terrorism researcher. ‘Nothing’s happened. But if something does happen, he can blame
the judiciary and the news media.’ ”); see also Max Fisher & Kitty Bennett, Our Articles on the
Attacks Trump Says the Media Didn’t Cover, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/the-white-house-list-of-terror-attacks-
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President publicly asserted that because of a “ridiculous” federal
district court decision by a “so-called judge” stopping enforcement of his
initial executive order on immigration and refugees, “many very bad
and dangerous people may be pouring into our country,” and that the
decision “opens up our country to potential terrorists and others that do
not have our best interests at heart.”276 He also contended that if the
federal government does not prevail in the litigation involving the
legality of the order, “we can never have the security and safety to which
we are entitled.”277 He then deemed “disgraceful” the appellate hearing
(initiated by his administration) before a panel of three judges of the
Ninth Circuit.278 He condemned the panel even though it was composed
of Republican and Democratic appointees alike who, in asking difficult
questions of both sides, were each models of professionalism and
competence.279 The panel was subsequently unanimous in rejecting the
administration’s position in the appeal.280
The President’s public antagonism and ad hominem attacks are
causing many commentators to opine that the President is
preemptively engaging in blame shifting in the event of a terrorist
attack.281 More disturbingly, a few commentators have expressed the
concern that the President may be trying to establish a narrative that
underreported-by-media.html?mtrref=www.google.com [https://perma.cc/57A6-EW3G] (stating
that President Trump claims the media is not sufficiently reporting terrorist attacks, and
providing links to media sources that reported on the White House’s list of terrorist attacks from
September 2014 to December 2016).
276. The President’s tweets that are quoted in the text are collected and analyzed by Jack
Goldsmith, Does Donald Trump Want to Lose the EO Battle in Court? Or Is Donald McGahn
Simply Ineffectual (or Worse)?, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2017, 8:22 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/doestrump-want-lose-eo-battle-court-or-donald-mcgahn-simply-ineffectual-or-worse [https://perma.cc/
4FLE-DAZK].
277. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:03 AM), https://twitter
.com/realdonaldtrump/status/829299566344359936?lang=en [https://perma.cc/5F2N-XZ7Q].
278. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 274 (quoting Trump’s characterization of the hearing before
the Ninth Circuit panel as “disgraceful”).
279. Audio of the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit panel, which took place on February
7, 2017, is available online. Oral Argument, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,
2017), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000010884 [https://perma.cc/
Q7H9-WA34].
280. Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam) (order denying
emergency motion for stay pending appeal), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/
02/09/17-35105.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A3A-EQWK].
281. See, e.g., Philip Rucker, ‘If Something Happens’: Trump Points His Finger in Case of a
Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ifsomething-happens-trump-points-his-finger-in-case-of-a-terror-attack/2017/02/06/8e315b78-eca611e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.aecde82fa795
[https://perma.cc/TH3Q-QYGP]
(“President Trump appears to be laying the groundwork to preemptively shift blame for any future
terrorist attack on U.S. soil from his administration to the federal judiciary, as well as to the
media.”); Shane, supra note 275 (same).
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he can use after an attack in order to rally a fearful public into accepting
his disregard of judicial authority.282 Although the courts are currently
asserting their authority, they will inevitably become more politically
vulnerable after an attack, especially a significant one.283
If the political environment for judicial independence becomes
more treacherous, it is reasonable to predict (although by no means
certain) that the process of reciprocal legitimation, or something like it,
will unfold. Proceeding incrementally and finding strength in numbers
is one potentially effective way for judges to rebut the President’s
repeated charges to his millions of Twitter followers that federal courts
are illegitimate because the judicial decisions going against him are
political. The situation may be somewhat reminiscent of the Court’s
public projection of unanimity in Brown.284 President Trump’s
accusations and conduct, as well as the disaggregated nature of the
litigation in response to his executive orders (that is, different suits filed
in different courts), may cause federal judges to find greater strength
in numbers than they would otherwise be likely to achieve.285
If that happens, there will be a certain irony in it: by
unjustifiably deriding the federal courts as political, the President will
have succeeded in encouraging them to act politically, at least to some
extent, in order to safeguard their own public legitimacy. But if events
unfold in that fashion, the federal courts will be acting politically in
arguably the most defensible sense of the word—in the sense of
statesmanship, not partisanship.286 And the potential defensibility of
judicial statesmanship in response to unjustified attacks on the public
legitimacy of courts illuminates why it is overstated to condemn

282. Curtis Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Judicial and Media Independence After the Next Attack,
LAWFARE (Feb. 9, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-and-media-independence
-after-next-attack [https://perma.cc/4F9B-AALM]; Paul Krugman, When the Fire Comes, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/opinion/when-the-fire-comes.html
[https://perma.cc/29R7-NPRY].
283. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 282 (making this point).
284. See supra text accompanying note 93 (observing that the Brown Court was in fact
divided). Ideologically diverse Justices may at times stick together to protect judicial power when
it is under threat. In addition to Brown, see, for example, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
285. Cf., e.g., Baker, supra note 274 (quoting the opinion of Jack Goldsmith that “[t]he
sloppiness and aggressiveness of the directives, combined with the attacks on judges, put extra
pressure on judges to rule against Trump”).
286. See generally Siegel, supra note 87 (offering a theoretical account of the phenomenon of
judicial statesmanship, which counsels judges to take some account of the conditions of their own
public legitimacy).
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reciprocal legitimation in all circumstances for compromising judicial
candor.287

287. Cf. Eric Posner, Judges v. Trump: Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/judges-v-trump-be-careful-what-you-wish-for
.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/9CYQ-V72B] (“The courts were playing politics, but of a valid
constitutional kind.”).
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APPENDIX
Voting Behavior of Circuit Court Judges in Recent
Same-Sex Marriage Cases
(Votes against a purely partisan prediction are noted in bold.)
CASE

CIRCUIT

RULING

MAJORITY

Second

Invalidated federal
law’s refusal to
recognize same-sex
marriage

Jacobs (George
H. W. Bush),
Droney (Obama)

Straub
(Clinton)

Fourth

Invalidated
Virginia’s ban on
same-sex marriage

Floyd (Obama),
Gregory
(Clinton recess
appointee, then
nom. by George
W. Bush)

Niemeyer
(George
H.W.
Bush)

Sixth

Upheld several
states’ restrictions
on same-sex
marriage

Sutton (George
W. Bush), Cook
(George W. Bush)

Daughtrey
(Clinton)

Baskin v.
Bogan (2014)

Seventh

Invalidated
Indiana’s and
Wisconsin’s bans on
same-sex marriage

Hollingsworth
v. Perry (2012)

Ninth

Invalidated
California’s
Proposition 8

Ninth

Invalidated Idaho’s
and Nevada’s bans
on same-sex
marriage

Ninth

Subjected sexualorientation
classifications to
heightened scrutiny

Reinhardt
(Carter), Gould
(Clinton), Berzon
(Clinton)
Reinhardt
(Carter), Berzon
(Clinton),
Schroeder
(Carter)

Tenth

Invalidated
Oklahoma’s ban on
same-sex marriage

Lucero (Clinton),
Holmes (George
W. Bush)

Kelly
(George
H.W.
Bush)

Tenth

Invalidated Utah’s
ban on same-sex
marriage

Lucero (Clinton),
Holmes (George
W. Bush)

Kelly
(George
H.W.
Bush)

United States
v. Windsor
(2012)

Bostic v.
Schaefer
(2014)

DeBoer v.
Snyder (2014)

Latta v. Otter
(2014)
SmithKline
Beecham
Corp. v.
Abbott Labs.
(2014)
Bishop v.
Smith (2014)

Kitchen v.
Herbert (2014)

Posner
(Reagan),
Hamilton
(Obama),
Williams
(Clinton)
Reinhardt
(Carter),
Hawkins
(Clinton)

DISSENT

Smith
(George W.
Bush)

